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United States 
of America 
Q:ongrrssional1Rccord 
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 9 2 d CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION 
Vol. 117 WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 1971 No. 54 
DRUG ABUSE IN THE MIT.ITARY 
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, inasmuch 
as the distinguished majority leader was 
speaking of "fragging" in South Vietnam, 
I would like to continue in that context 
for just a few minutes before I begin 
with the statement I prepared for this 
period. 
As I listened to the distinguished 
majority leader this morning note the 
209 reported incidents of last year in 
Vietnam, and later we developed in 
colloquy the fact that this figure un-
doubtedly did not include any of those 
incidents which may have taken place 
under actual combat conditions or condi-
tions where combat troops were other 
than outer perimeter or central defensive 
troops, the thought occurred to me that 
in the study I am presenting this morn-
ing on drug dependence and drug use 
ln the mllitary we wUI see the causes 
behind many of those incidents of 
fragging or assassinations of American 
officers by others in the military, regard-
less of the circumstances. 
Mr. President, I herewith transmit to 
the Senate a comprehensive report on 
drug abuse in the Armed Forces pre-
pared by the staff of the Special Sub-
committee on Alcoholism and Narcotics 
of the Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare. I ask unanimous consent that 
the report be printed in the RECORD at 
the conclusion of my remarks as ex-
hibit 2. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it is so ordered. 
<See exhibit 2.) 
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, this re-
port is the result of an extended study 
by the subcommittee which began a year 
ago with the approval of the distin-
guished chairman of the Committee on 
Armed Service~, Senator JOHN STENNIS, 
and the distinguished ranking m1n0l;ty 
member of that committee, Senator MAR-
CARET CHASE SMITH. 
The report does not purport to be an 
indepth analysis and investigation of 
this very large and complicated subject 
field. It is, rather. an inclusive, prelim-
inary, base-level survey. Its tone is dis-
passionate and objective, reflecting a 
conscientious, bipartisan effort on the 
part of the staff. It represents, I be-
lieve, a valuable and necessary first step 
in realistically facing a very large and 
compelling national problem. 
Senate 
I believe no one can read this report, 
low keyed as it is, without feeling the 
urgency, the magnitude, the pervasive-
ness, and the peril of the infiltration of 
our Armed Forces by the drug epidemic 
prevalent throughout our civilian society. 
The report will be used primarily as a 
working tool in discussions with the ap-
propriate military authorities to identify 
those actions which can be taken under 
existing administrative framework and 
those that may require legislation for 
achieving solutions. The primary intent 
of the subcommittee from the beginning 
has been to explore a serious problem 
and to help find effective remedies for it, 
not to sensationalize the subject matter 
or to try to affix blame. Our approach is 
from the health standpoint, rather than 
from the law enforcement standpoint, 
although in some respects the two ap-
proaches overlap somewhat. 
Mr. President, in all fairness, it must 
be recognized that the sudden explosion 
of the drug epidemic in our armed serv-
ices, as in our civilian society, was not 
foreseen. The Armed Forces were under-
standably not equipped to handle it. The 
principal business of an army is to fi~~:ht, 
not to treat and reh31bilitate drug addicts. 
Yet, the problem is upon us and the 
Armed Forces, like the rest of our society, 
must face it realistically. And here we 
are talking about a matter that has a 
profound bearing on our national secu-
rity as well as on the health of the per-
sonnel involved and the well-being of 
the civilian society to which they will 
eventually return. 
The dilemma our military leadership 
faces is the same dilemma that con-
founds the civilian sector of American 
society. That dilemma fiows from a con-
flict between laws based on traditional 
moralistic attitudes and, on the other 
hand, a very real American desire to aid 
the afflicted. Boiled down to its simplest 
terms, that dilemma is this: Shall the 
per5"on who abuses drugs be treated puni-
tively or as someone who needs help? 
In a limited attempt to resolve that 
question, the Defense Department last 
October authorized the military services 
to establish amnesty programs on a 
trial basis. Essentially, this policy per-
mits the individual services to offer treat-
ment without punishment to any drug 
user who asks for it. 
So far. only the Army and the Air 
Force have adopted implementing poli-
cies. Neither is consistent with the other. 
Indeed, as the distinguished Senator 
from Pennsylvania ('Mr. SCHWEIKER) 
has pointed out, the Army policy permits 
a unit commander to determine in the 
final analysis whether to execute the 
policy. The Air Force policy-much in 
the pattern of its po!.icy toward alcohol-
ics-seems to discourage those of its 
members on flying status or in sensitive 
positions from even volunteering for 
treatment. 
Although 6 months have elapsed since 
the Defense Department amnesty pol-
icy was announced. the Navy and the Ma-
rine Corps have not yet implemented it. 
I understand that such a policy instruc-
tion in draft form, however, is working 
its way through the Pentagon mills. 
My primary recommendation, there-
fore, is that the Defense Department 
should establish a comprehensive, inte-
grated, and mandatory policy under 
which service members who are drug de-
pendent or who are medically ill drug 
abusers are provided the same opportu-
nity for treatment and rehabilitation as 
would be afforded to any military person 
who is ill. 
Such a policy would include the fol-
lowing principles: 
First. A member who is a medically ill 
drug abuser or a drug dependent person 
should be summarily discharged from the 
service only if he has refused to accept 
appropriate treatment as shall be offered 
by the service. 
Second. A member who is identified as 
a drug dependent person or a medically 
ill drug abuser as a result of his arrest 
for a drug-related offense should be dealt 
with through normal military judicial or 
disciplinary processes. In determining 
how to handle an individual case, pri-
mary emphasis should be given to how 
best to treat a:nd rehabilitate the indi-
vidual. It may be useful, for example, to 
consider postponement of the trial or dis-
ciplinary proceeding, suspension of sen-
tence, or other devices commonly used in 
civilian courts in order to effect rehabili-
tation. 
Third. A member with drug abuse or 
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drug dependence problems should be en-
couraged to seek medical or other assist-
ance and, when he does so, should not 
be subject to disciplinary or other puni-
tive action-administrative or other-
wise-based on information he has given 
in seeking or receiving such assistance. 
The military does not now recognize con-
fidentiality in the doctor-patient rela-
tionship. Under this recommendation, 
absolute confidentiality would be pre-
served unless competent medical author-
ity determines that the patient is a dan-
ger to himself or others; however, no 
information divulged by the patient in 
confidence should be admitted into evi-
dence in disciplinary proceedings against 
him without his consent. 
Fourth. A member who seeks such as-
sistance should be offered every oppor-
tunity to be restored to useful military 
service with. the Armed Forces. Th.is con-
templates that such persons may be of-
fered temporary sick leave or given tasks 
they are capable of performing while 
undergoing treatment and rehabilitation. 
Fifth. When security clearance, flying 
status, or other classification affecting 
job position or pay is withdrawn from a 
member who sought assistance as a drug 
dependent pe-rson or as a medically ill 
drug abuser. it should be reinstated 
within 6 months after his treatment has 
been completed unless he fails during 
th.is period to perform at the level at 
which he was performing prior to his 
request for treatment. 
Sixth. A member who has sought or 
accepted treatment and rehabilitation 
should be separated only when such 
treatment and rehabilitation has re-
peatedly failed and competent medical 
authority has determined that he can-
not be restored to useful military service. 
These, Mr. President, are some recom-
mendations I would make in the treat-
ment and rehabilitation area. But there 
are other problem areas demanding at-
tention if we are to prevent present and 
future generations of military personnel 
from abusing drugs and if we are to bring 
into treatment programs those who al-
ready have drug problems no matter 
where they surface in the military sys-
tem. 
One finding in the staff report is that 
a significant proportion of drug users, in-
cluding those on "hard" drugs, are being 
admitted to the service because of inade-
quate preinduction screening. In my 
opinion, the Armed Forces should not 
only give special priority to developing 
reliable methods of identfying actual and 
potential drug abusers at this point in 
the system; they should also create a 
mechanism whereby those rejected for 
military service because of drug prob-
lems are referred, with their consent, to 
civilian prevention and treatment facili-
ties. 
It is also clear from the report that the 
military's drug abuse prevention-educa-
tion programs have failed to teach com-
manders -to understand the causes of 
drug abuse among their troops or how to 
deal with it in other than a punitive way. 
These programs have also failed to 
motivate service personnel effectively 
against the use of dru~s. 
I recommend that the Armed Forces-
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in consultation with the Office of Educa-
tion the National Institute of Mental 
Heaith, the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs, and outside experts-
carry out a massive upgrading of its 
present prevention and 'educational ef-
forts with the objectives I have outlined 
in mind. 
These efforts should present factual 
information in an unbiased way, en-
courage individual discussion and par-
ticipation, and include discussions both 
of alcohol and alcoholism together w1th 
nonchemical alternatives to drug use 
and abuse. It is extremely important that 
these efforts reach every level of the mili-
tary structure-commanders as well as 
troops. 
In some segmEnts of the Armed Forces, 
special traveling drug abuse teams with 
expertise in effective educational tech-
niques and with knowledge of the legal, 
medical, and social ramifications of drug 
use and abuse are already being used ef-
fectively. These teams should be given 
additional support, and th.is program 
should be expanded. 
PerhaPG most importantly in the pre-
vention area, the Armed Forces should 
give greater attention to providing more 
recreation, entertainment, physical ac-
tivity and meaningful work in order to 
abate those conditions-particularly 
boredom and "make work" jobs-which 
appear to be conducive to drug abuse. 
This need is already apparent among 
our troops in Germany, and it is becom-
ing increasingly apparent in Southeast 
Asia where many towns are off limits, 
our troops have less to do, and a vast as-
sortment of potent drugs-marihuana, 
virtually pure heroin, stimulants, and de-
pressants-are readily and inexpensively 
available. 
In the traini~ area, two categories of 
military personnel demand special atten-
tion. One group, as I have indicated, in-
cludes those involved in screening candi-
dates for induction into the Armed 
Forces. The other group includes those 
who are involved in day-to-day inter-
personal dealings with drug abuse prob-
lems-unit commanders, noncommis-
sioned officers, chaplains, medical and so-
cial workers, law enforcement personnel, 
and the like. Both of these grouPG re-
quire specialized training not only in 
detecting actual and potential drug abus-
ers but, more importantly. in dealing ef-
fectivelY and humanely with the conse-
quences of their abuse. 
As for those drug dependent individ-
uals or medically ill drug abusers who 
are separated from service for those rea-
sons, I propose that they be granted a 
nonpunitive discharge and be afforded 
the same opportunities for treatment and 
rehabilitation afforded all persons dis-
charged as physically or mentally dis-
abled. Their drug-related actions should 
be not regarded as the result of inten-
tional misconduct or willful neglect. In 
th.is connection, the Veterans' Adminis-
tration should give priority to increas-
ing its capacity to care for drug-depend-
ent persons or medically ill drug 
abusers. 
These are the highlights of my own 
recommendations. I have a more detailed 
list. and I ask unanimous consent that 
this list be printed in the RECORD at the 
conclusion of my remarks. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it is so ordered. 
<See exhibit u 
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, the drug 
epidemic has reached a point that is no 
longer acceptable in our civilian society. 
It is even more unacceptable in the 
armed services entrusted with the de-
fense of our country. 
As the report shows, the subcommittee 
staff did not find factual evidence that 
would establish drug usage as a signifi-
cant factor in actual combat. In Viet-
nam, commanders told the staff that, be-
cause of the personal danger involved, 
there was far less smoking of marihuana 
in combat areas than in rear support 
areas. Yet, some studies indicate a posi-
tive correlation between marihuana us-
age and combat exposure. In any event, 
one cannot believe there is anything less 
than immense danger in the use of dan-
gerous drugs in a war theater, as we have 
heard stated on the floor of the Senate 
today. 
After all, this is a guerrilla war, a war 
of infiltration in which the ambush and 
the booby trap figure largely. A lapse of 
vigilance or judgment could easily mean 
the loss of lif~ven in rear support 
areas. 
We know the relationship between vio-
lence and drug addiction here at home. 
While no reliable studies on the relation 
of drug abuse and violence in battle areas 
are available, there is ample reason to 
believe there is a close tie. 
While we have no hard evidence that 
drug abuse contributed to such incidents 
as My Lai, there is that possibility. 
Press reports carry stories, one of 
which has been elcquently presented here 
this morning, of widespread "fragging" 
in Vietnam-the assassination of Amer-
ican officers by our own troops in the 
field. If a man will go to the extent of 
rolling a fragmentation bomb under the 
flap of an officer's tent, it is reasonable 
to suspect that drugs may and probably 
do figure in the story in some way. 
Finally, :we have the hideous picture 
before us of men, inured to violence and 
addicted to drugs, returning to civilian 
society from the war area compelled to 
use the skills of violence they have 
learned as soldiers in criminals acts here 
at home in order to support their habit. 
Mr. President, I believe it is impera-
tive that strong measures be taken to 
stem the rapidly growing drug epidemic 
in our armed services. I believe the 
Armed Forces are in a unique position to 
move out on this and to assert national 
leadership in the drug abuse prevention, 
control, treatment, and rehabilitation 
field. I feel confident that we in Con-
gress will give them our full support in 
these endeavors. It is mv hope that the 
public release today of this staff report 
will encourage t hose in the highest posi-
tions of our military leadership to accept 
the challenge, will encourage those of us 
in the Congress of the United States to 
support the mihtary leadership in the 
initiation of programs that are absolutely 
essential to the military of this country, 
and will encourage us to take those ac-
tions legislatively that can undergird 
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and support, so that we can begin to 
alleviate the great dangers from these 
problems. 
Mr. President, there are many ways 
in which we can begin. Just a few weeks 
ago, for example, I had the opportunity 
to stop by the Glasgow Air Force Base 
in Montana, where there are excellent 
facilities for long-term usage, fully and 
completely built, with excellent hos-
pital facilities already existing, yet 
standing idle. We are talking about the 
need for long-range of rehabilitation 
and treatment, and for feeding back into 
our society those men who are the re-
sponsibility of our society, and have 
served our country in combat. Certainly, 
at this critical time, we must not be 
said to lack the irutiative to acce·pt ·the 
challenge or the innovative ability to 
adopt the programs that can begin to 
resolve these issues. 
EXHIBIT 1 
IDENTIFICATION OF DRUG ABUSERS AND DRUG 
DEPENDENT PERSONS 
The Armed Forces should give special pri-
ority to developing reliable methods of Iden-
tifying drug abusers and potential drug_ 
abusers at the Armed Forces Examining and 
Entrance Stations and elsewhere In the mili-
tary system. 
The GeneJ;tll Accounting Office (GAO) 
shoUld be asked to undertake a study to de-
termine whether entrance examinations can 
and should be made more effective In screen-
Ing out drug abusers and those who are prone 
to drug abuse. Such a study shoUld Include 
an analysis of the techniques which can be 
used to screen such Individuals, a cost-benefit 
analysis of such techniques, and recom-
mendations of those techniques which can 
and should be used by the Armed Forces. 
Ind.! victuals who are rejected for service In 
the Armed Forces because of drug abuse or 
drug dependence should, with their consent, 
be referred to appropriate civilian prevention 
and treatment facilities. This would apply to 
candidates for Induction as well as to In-serv-
Ice personnel. 
The Armed Forces should establish a sys-
tem for evaluating the performance of each 
AFEES station In screening out drug abusers. 
Such a system should seek to Identify those 
AFEES stations where significant numbers 
of Individuals have been admitted to service 
with undetected drug abuse and drug de-
pendence problems which subsequently In-
terfere with their military performance. 
P~VENTION 
The Armed Forces, In consultation with the 
Office of Education, the National Institute of 
Mental Health, the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs, and outside experts, should 
carry out a massive upgrading of Its present 
efforts toward preventing and educating 
against drug abuse and drug dependence. 
These efforts should present factual Informa-
tion In an unbiased way, encourage Indi-
vidual discussion and participation, Include 
discussions of alcohol abuse and alcoholtsm, 
and Include discussions of non-chemical al-
ternatives to drug use and abuse. It Is ex-
tremely Important that these efforts be 
tailored to and reach each level of the mili-
tary structure. 
Special traveling drug abuse teams with 
expertise In effective educational techniques 
and a knowledge of legal, medical and social 
ramifications of drug use and abuse are being 
effectively In some segments of the Armed 
Forces. Additional support should be given to 
these teams, and this program should be 
expanded. 
The Armed Forces should give greater at-
tention to providing more recreation, enter-
tainment, physical activity and meaningful 
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work In order to abate those condl tlons, 
particularly boredom and "make work" jobs, 
which appear to be conductive to drug abuse. 
An Intensive evaluation of au prevention 
efforts In this area should be carried out to 
Insure their effectiveness. 
TRATNING 
Specialized Information and training In the 
recognition of drug abuse and drug depend-
ence should be provided to personnel In-
volved In screening candidates for Induction 
Into the Armed Forces. 
Additional emphasis shoUld be given to 
providing specialized Information and train-
Ing to personnel Involved In dealing with 
drug abuse problems, Including unit com-
manders, noncommissioned officers, chap-
lains, medical and social work personnel, law 
enforcement personnel and the like. 
· An In tens! ve eva! uatlon of all training ef-
forts In this area should be earned out In 
order to Insure their effectiveness. 
TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION 
A. The Defense Department should estab-
llsh a comprehensive, Integrated, and man-
datory policy under which service members 
who are c!rUg dependent or are med.lcally Ill 
drug abusers are provided with the same op-
portunities for treatment and rehabilitation 
as would be afforded to any military person-
nel who are Ill. Such a policy should Include 
the following principles: . 
1. A member who Is a medically Ill drug 
abuser or a drug dependent person shoUld 
not be summarily discharged from the serv-
Ice, unless he has refused to accept appro-
priate treatment as shall be offered by the 
service. 
2. A member who Is Identified as a drug 
dependent person or a medically Ill drug 
abuser as a resuJ t a! his arrest for a drug-
related offense, should be dealt with through 
normal military jud icial or disciplinary proc-
esses. In determining how to handle an In-
dividual case, primary emphasis should be 
given to how best to treat and rehabilitate 
the Individual. It may be useful, for exam-
ple, to consider postponement of the trial 
or disciplinary proceeding, suspension of sen-
tence, and other devices commonly used In 
civilian courts In order to effect rehabilita-
tion. · 
3. A member with drug abuse or drug de-
pendence problems should be encouraged to 
seek medical assistance and, when he does so, 
should not be subject to disciplinary or other 
punitive action based on fnformatlon he has 
given In seeking or receiving such assistance. 
Absolute confidentiality should be preserved 
unless competent medical authority deter-
mines that the patient ls a danger to him-
self or others; however, no Information di-
vulged by the patient In confidence should 
be admitted Into evidence 1n disciplinary 
proceedings against him without his consent. 
4. A member who seeks such assistance 
should be offered every opportunity to be 
restored to useful military service wLthln the 
Armed Forces. This contemplates that such 
person may be offered temporary sick leave 
or given tasks they are capable of perform-
Ing while undergoing treatment and rehab111-
tatlon. 
5. When security clearance, flying stat us 
or other classification affecting job position 
or pay Is withdrawn from a member who 
sought assistance as a drug i!ependent per-
son or a medically 111 drug abuser, It should 
be reinstated within six months after his 
treatment has been completed unless he 
fans during this period to perform at the 
level at which he was performing prior to 
treatment. 
6. r.. member who has sought or accepted 
treatment and rehabilitation should be sep-
arated only when such treatment and re-
habilitation has repeatedly failed and com-
petent medical authority has determined 
that he cannot be restored to use!ul mJUtary 
service. 
B. The present amnesty program should 
be totally re-evaluated In the light of the 
above principles and objectives. 
C. A study shoUld be carried out to deter-
mine whether treatment and reha.bllltatlon 
efforts should be carried out In Armed Forces-
wide central t reatment facilities or, rather. 
In local settings. 
SEPARATION 
A member who Is a medically 111 drug 
abuser or a drug dependent person should 
be granted a non-punitive discharge and 
shoUld be afforded the same opportunities 
for treatment and rehab1lltatlon afforded all 
persons discharged as physically or mentally 
disabled. His drug-related actions should not 
be regarded as the result of Intentional mis-
conduct or willfUl neglect. Such a person 
shoUld retain the same rights and benefits 
as any other person afflicted with serious 111-
nesses, and should not Jose pension, retire-
ment, medical or other rights because he 
Is a medically Ill drug abuser or a drug de-
pendent person. 
The Veterans Administration should give 
priority to Increasing Its capab1llty to care 
for drug dependent persons or medically 111 
drug )l.busers. In doing so, It should consider 
entering Into contractual arrangements with 
such facilities as have demonstrated their ef-
fectiveness In the treatment and rehabilita-
tion area. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
In general, the Armed Forces should recog-
nize their unique poeltlon to assert national 
leadership In Identifying drug abusers and 
drug dependent persons; In developing and 
evaluating effective treatment and rehabili-
tation, research, prevention and education 
programs; and making a distinct contribu-
tion toward the abatement of this national 
problem. 
The Armed Forces shoUld consider ways 
by which they can have an affirmative Im-
pact on the abatement of the drug epidemic 
In clv1llan society. The most obvious con-
tributions would lrtclude sharing Informa-
tion and data relevant to the drug problem, 
and the donation or sale at present value of 
surplus equipment, fac1lltles and the like 
that might be useful In combatting the drug 
problem. 
The Armed Forces shoUld establish a spe-
cial program to provide prevention, treat-
ment and rehab1lltatlon services to depend-
ents of m1lltary personnel. . 
Special consldera tton should be gl ven to 
Insuring that continuity Is preserved In all 
prevention and treatment and rehabilitation 
programs. This should apply to personnel 
operating these programs. It shoUld also ap-
ply to those receiving tpe benefits of treat-
ment and rehabilitation programs. 
The Congress should authorize and ap-
propriate sufficient funds to carry out the 
above recommendations. 
A special lmpact~d aid program should 
be created to assist communities whose drug 
problem has been aggravated by the prev-
alence of drug abuse among military per-
sonnel stationed nearby. 
The Armed Forces should provide written 
reports, at six-month Intervals, on their 
progress toward achieving the objectives 
outlined above. 
EXHIBIT 2 
STAFF REPORT ON !DRUG ABUSE IN THE 
MILITARY 
To: Members of Alcoholism and Narcotics 
Subcommittee. 
From: The SubcommJttee Staff. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 1970, the Subcommittee 
staff began an Investigation of drug abuse In 
the military. This was undertaken by au-
thority of an Apr11 16, 1970, letter !rom 
'senator John C. Stennis, Chairman o! the 
Armed Services Committee, to Senator 
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Hughes, Chairman of the Subcommittee, as 
well as under the Subcommittee's own au-
thority to act In the drug abuse ~~orea. The 
objectives of the Investigation were to ex-
plore: the extent and nature of drug and 
alcohol abuse In the military; the Impact 
which this abuse Is having upon Individuals, 
the armed services, and American society as 
a whole; the measures, particularly In the 
areas of education, treatment, and rehabili-
tation, which the military Is taking to meet 
the problem; and the areas In which further 
Investigation or action might be taken. 
In carrying out the Investigation the mem-
bers of the staff attempted to cover the prob-
lem from two approaches. First, we attempted 
to look at the problem from a geographical 
point of view. We looked at stateside bases 
(primarily In the Eastern United States}, 
Southeast Asia and the Far East (Hong 
Kong, Thailand, South VIetnam, Japan, and 
Korea}, and Europe (Germany and England}. 
We visited Southeast Asia and the Far East 
In September, 1970, and Europe In January, 
1971. In order to cover the broadest possible 
ground In the short time we had available, 
we split Into teams In both Southeast Asia 
and Europe. 
Second, the staff also attempted to visit 
examples or Installations covering the entire 
raage of the military system: Induction, 
basic training, advanced training, support 
troops, and combat troops (In the field and 
returnees}. We concentrated primarily on the 
Army for two reasons: It has the largest 
number or personnel and It has nearly all 
ot the draftees. However, In Southeast Asia 
and Europe, we also looked at the other 
branches In the same environment to deter-
mine what contrast, If any, we would find. 
Members at the staff were: Southeast Asia: 
Robert 0. Harris, Staff Director; Wade Clarke, 
Majority Counsel; Julian Granger, stat!' In-
vestigator; Richard J. Wise, Minority Coun-
sel, and Jay B. Cutler, Mlmority Counsel. In 
Europe the above were joined by Nlk Edes 
or Senator Williams' staff. 
Our primary method of investigation was 
dlscusslon with and oonectlon of data from 
the members or command at each !aclllty 
visited. At virtually every Installation, we 
dlscussed the problems with groups com-
posed or co=nd personnel, the provost 
marshal, the medical officer, the judge ad-
vocate, the chaplain, and, on occasion, the 
tn!ormrutlon officer. In moot installations, 
command relied moot heavily on the data 
supplied by the provost marshal and the 
medical officer to answer our questions. This 
data does not give an accurate picture of 
either the extent of use or the nature of 
use, but It Is the best available In most com-
mand situations. In addition to command 
discussions, we attempted, where possible, 
and within the limited time available, to 
Interview Individual enlisted men and junior 
officers. We also collected data In written and 
oral form from other agencies and lndl vld-
ua!s associated with the military. 
On all or our visits we made It clear to 
those contacted that we were Interested tn 
low key, Informal discussion and that our 
primary lnt<·rest was In the health and pre-
vention aspects or the problem. The staff 
believes that this allayed some or the rears 
that we were attempting to gather data tar 
an expose or criticism of the military and 
Increased the cooperation we received, par-
ticularly !rom the Army. In general we were 
satisfied with the truthfulness or thooe we 
contacted. The Army was more realistic tn 
assessing their problem. They seemed more 
w1111ng to recognize drug abuse as a problem 
and to take action both to prevent It and 
to alleviate Its effects. In this regard, we 
would rate the other services In the follow-
Ing order: the Air Force, the Navy, and the 
Marines. 
What follows Is a synthesis by the staff o! 
Its findings and recommendations based 
upon Its investigation. 
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II. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF DRUG USE 
The staff has attempted to ascertain who 
the military drug users are; how many of 
them there are, where they use their drugs, 
what drugs they use, when they tend to use 
drugs, and why they use drugs. While we 
make some conclusions about these factors, 
they are by no means a.ppllca.ble to all mlll-
tary drug users. The nature or drug use, the 
circumstances of use and the reasons for use 
vary widely. However, the generalizations 
which we do draw lndlcate the direction In 
which drug abuse appears to be going a.nd 
suggest the areas In w.b.lch further action 
might be taken In order to meet the drug 
abuse crisis. 
A. The users: Who and how many 
There Is a paucity of hard data on which 
to base an authoritative finding or the extent 
of drug use In the military. The few studies 
w'h1ch exist have been made exclusively 
among Army populations and are severely 
!lmlted both In numbers and In scope. This 
void was recognized when Department of De-
fense witnesses disclosed plans for ' a world-
wide epidemiological survey of drug use 
among all members of the armed forces, to be 
undertaken this year. 
Nevertheless, certain Insights may be 
gained from the available studies. It should 
be noted that these studies generally reveal 
drug use of a greater amount than do the 
medlcal and law enforcement figures given 
the staff. However, they seem to be lower 
than the subjective assessments or command 
particularly at junior levels. Among those 
studies most heavily re!led upon In this re-
port ·(all cited In the hearings record) are 
the following: ( 1} Patterns of Drug Use: A 
Study of 5,482 Subjects, by Black, Owens and 
Wolff, Fort S111, Oklahoma, 1970; (2} Drug 
Use In VIetnam-A Survey Among Army Per-
sonnel In the Two Northern Corps, Stanton, 
1969; (3} Marihuana. In VIetnam: A Survey o! 
Use Among Army Enlisted Men In the Two 
Southern Corps, Roffman and Sapo!, 1967; 
(4} Marihuana In a. Tactical Unit In Vietnam, 
Treanor and Skrlpol, 1970; (5} Marihuana 
Use In VIetnam: A Prellminary Study, 1968; 
and (6} A Study o! Marihuana and Opiate 
Use In the 82nd Airborne Division, 1969. 0! 
these, only the Stanton and Treanor-Skrlpol 
studies used samples which Included both 
officers and en!lsted men; the others con-
centrated on en!lsted men In the lower ranks. 
Patterns of drug use shown by the most 
recent studies seem to be conslsten t w1 th the 
findings from what Is considered to be the 
most scientifically valld study or them all, 
the one by Stanton. He grouped nonusers, 
(1-20 times used}, heavy users (21-199 times 
used}, and habituated users (200 or more 
times used}. He also sampled both Incoming 
and outgoing troops. Overall, he found that 
53.2 percent or enllsted men had used mari-
huana at least once In their !lves. He also 
found a trend toward more frequent usage In 
VIetnam than had been reported two years 
ear!ler. or the 50.1 percent who reported 
t>slng marihuana In VIetnam, 20.5 percent 
were casual users, 11.9 percent were heavy 
users, and 17.7 percent were habituated 
users; In other words, heavy and habituated 
users were more numerous than casual users. 
Patterns or other drug use which Stanton 
round among soldlers leaving Veltnam In-
cluded the following: (1} opium use was 
reported by 17.4 percent (9.8 percent casual 
users, 5.8 percent heavy users, 1.8 percent 
habituated users}; (2} amphetamine use was 
reported by 16.2 percent ( 11 percent casual 
users, 4 percent heavy users, 1.2 percent 
habituated users}; (3} barbiturate use was 
reported by 11.6 percent (7.8 percen.t casual 
users, 2.7 percent heavy users, 1.1 habituated 
users}; (4} heroin/ morphine use was re-
ported by 2.2 percent ( 1.4 percent casual 
users, .6 percent heavy users, .2 percent 
habituated users}; (5} acid (LSD, STP) use 
was reported by 5.3 percent (3.2 percent 
casual users, 1.6 percent heavy users, .5 per-
cent habituated users}. 
In general, It can be concluded !rom all 
these studies that drug use, a.t least among 
Army members, has been Increasing with the 
passage of years since 19£7, when the first 
study was conducted, and that a growing pro-
portion of servicemen are entering the service 
with a history or drug use. 
There Is no pure stereotype o! the drug 
user In the mllltary, just as there ta none In 
clvlllan society. Whlle the great bulk of drug 
abusers are enllsted men or lower rank be-
tween the ages or 18 and 26, users may also 
be found In the non-commissioned and com-
missioned officer ranks; for example, a heroin-
hooked sergeant at Fort Bragg was "the out-
stan.dlng N'OO In his company" or ·a colonel 
In VIetnam who became a "speed freak" from 
taking amphetamines to stay awake on long 
patrols and then used other drugs to get to 
sleep. Whlle these extremes do exist, the age 
group or the typical user Is much the sa.me as 
It Is In clvlllan society. 
From the studles and from our on-site In-
vestigation we _would ascribe the following 
characteristics to most drug abusers In the 
mllltary: age 19-22, rank E-4 or below, un-
married, less than high school graduate, 
either draftee or non-career oriented enlistee, 
equally from field or support units on tlr8t 
overseas tour. 
Other factors seem to be present fn those 
who become regular or habituated users. 
These persons are generally from broken 
homes, have a lower education (are high 
school drop-outs}, have Insufficient persona.!-
ltles to deal with their fears nnd stress (pas-
sive-aggressive personalltles, Immature, 6ltu-
atlonal adjustment problems, low-self-
esteem, lack o! long-term ambitions, etc.} 
and are Jlkely to become Involved In other 
behavioral problems within the military so-
ciety. In VIetnam, we were told that nearly 
all of the arrests for drug offenses were In-
cidental to arrests for other violations, such 
as uniform violation, curfew violation, off-
limitS violations, etc. The cases which re-
quired med!ca.l treatment usually were those 
with these kinds or negative ·behavior pat-
terns and with psychological problems which 
went beyond their drug use. At Fort Dlx, New 
Jersey, many of those who were being held 
In the Special Processing Detachment were 
also drug abusers. The Special Processing 
Detachment Is primarily a holdlng unit for 
Individuals apprehended anywhere along the 
East Coast for being AWOL. They are sent 
to Fort Dlx untll their records ca.n be located 
and their proper unit determined. 
This tndlvidual who Is going to become a 
habitual user or drugs and who Is going to 
become a. problem for the mll1tary-1n either 
medical or dlsclpllna.ry terms-Is an Individ-
ual who has personallty problems sumctently 
serious that he would llkely become a prob-
lem In whatever societal structure he Is ln. 
It shou1d be emphasized that the drug 
user-particularly the heavy user-Is likely 
to be a member or a peer group or sub-cul-
tural group In which the taking of drugs 
plays an Important role. For example, we 
were told that In Germany most arrests for 
drug abuse were made In groups. These ar-
rests by the Criminal Investigation Divi-
sion were usually the result or the Infiltra-
tion of a group by an agent and when the 
arrests were made the entire group was 
taken. 
The sub-culture Is best Ulustrated by the 
experience at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. 
There the drug users leave the post to con-
gregate In pads rented by small groups for 
the purpose or off-duty relaxation through 
drugs. These pads are characterized by psy-
chedellc decorations, acid rock music, and 
by the mod dress or the participants. we 
were also told In several places that the fig-
ures on the extent or use were distorted de-
pending upon which group a.n Individual 
trooper belonged to. If the person questioned 
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was a non-user, he associated with other 
non-users and tended to view all use In 
terms o! his group; his estimates were usu-
ally Jow. The user on the other hand asso-
ciated with other users and tended to feel 
that everyone used drugs. 
B. The drugs being used 
The kinds of drugs being used In any par-
ticular area depend to a large degree upon 
the extent to which they are locally avail-
able. In Thailand and VIetnam, there are 
few effective controls on the avaUablllty of 
any drug. Because of a lack of doctors, 
apothecary shops dispense virtually every 
manufactured drug and many herbs and 
other types of remedies. These are dispensed 
without a prescription to any buyer. Also In 
Thailand and VIetnam, as In most Southeast 
Asia nations, opium, particularly among the 
Chinese populations, has been the drug of 
choice of the natives. This and Its deriva-
tives, morphine and heroin, were reportedly 
supplied primarily by an organized network 
of Chinese operating In nearly all nations. 
In VIetnam and Thailand marihuana w><s 
freely avaUable. In ThaUand, the members 
of the staff had no dlfficul ty In procuring 
"taUored" marihuana cigarettes with filter-
tips. These cost $1.50 for 15. In the United 
States a similar amount would cost at least 
five times as much. They can be procured 
from or through bar girls, taxi drivers, and 
even young chUdren on the street. In Nak-
hon Phanom, Thailand, we were shown 
apothecary shops which dispense the var-
Ious amphetamines and barbiturates which 
some Air Force troops use. These were small 
shops with an open front and shelves loaded 
with bottles and jars. Drugs were dispensed 
either by name or by describing a set of 
symptoms which Jed the shopkeeper to dis-
pense whatever he felt would solve the prob-
lem. 
The Southeast Asia marihuana Is fresh and 
potent. Delta 9 Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) 
Is the active Ingredient In marihuana. The 
average sample available In Southeast Asia 
contains between 3.5 and 4.0 percent THC. 
This Is much higher than the average Y, to 
% of one percent THC which U.S.-grown 
marihuana contains. The preference for mari-
huana In Southeast Asia among U.S. troops 
Is ascribed to ready avallab111ty, Inexpensive-
ness, ease of cachement, non-addlctlveness 
and the quality of the Intoxication produced. 
Stanton found a growing trend among 
u.s. troops In VIetnam toward the use of 
opium. This Is available In liquid or powdered 
form. Among the departing enlisted men In 
his sample, only 6.3 percent reported having 
used· opium before their arrival but 17.4 per-
cent reported use upon leaving. However, 
the question has been raised as to whether 
these troops really know what they were 
using was opium. We also heard of opium 
being available In the form of "OJ's"-marl-
huana cigarettes dipped In liquid opium. 
Stanton's 17.4 percentage figure for opium 
use In VIetnam places that drug ahead of 
amphetamines, or "speed," In popularity 
among the troops. The Incidence of amphet-
amine use among outgoing enlisted men was 
16.2 percent, up from 12.4 percent usage be-
fore their arrival In VIetnam. Barbiturates 
were favored by 11.6 percent. Other drugs 
used were heroin, morphine and "acid" (LSD, 
STP), with the use of "acid" actually show-
Ing a drop In the before and after figures. 
We were regularly Informed that there was 
an Increase In the avallabUity, experimenta-
tion with, and use of heroin. There seemed 
to be an Increase In the hospitalizations for 
heroin withdrawal. Heroin Is available In 
two forms : "Red Rock" heroin from Thailand 
(reportedly brought to VIetnam by Thai 
troops) and refined heroin. Red Rock Is gen-
erally 3-4 percent heroin, 3-4 percent strych-
nine, and 32 percent caffeine. The refined 
heroin Is In 100- and 300-mllllgram capsules 
containing 97 percent heroin as compared to 
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the 5 or 6 percent heroin usually available In 
the U.S. 
The two most commonly used amphet-
amines come In liquid form. They are Maxi-
tone Fo~te and Obesltol, both of French 
manufacture. Maxltone Forte Is taken orally 
mixed with Coke or used Intravenously. 
Obesltol Is taken orally. The barbiturates 
most commonly used In Southeast Asia are 
Blnoctal and Amlnoctal, also of French 
manufacture. 
In Germany, there Is a plentiful supply of 
hashish, amphetamines, and barbiturates, 
and tJ.s. troops and their dependents have 
easy and Inexpensive access to them. Hashish 
Is by far the drug of choice and Is In wide-
spread use. It Is reputedly brought In by 
"guest worker" nationals from growing coun-
tries such as TUrkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon 
and by a number of criminal syndicates. We 
were told It Is distributed by German na-
tionals, by American m111tary personnel and 
former servicemen who were discharged In 
Europe. "Uppers" and "downers"-amphet-
amlne preparations, Llbrlum, Valium and 
Darvon-may be purchased Inexpensively 
over t'he counter, without prescription, In 
any German drug store. 
LSD Is also used In slgn11l.cant amounts by 
troops In Germany. Thts ts either brought In 
from the U.S. or made In Illicit laboratories 
In Germany. We had very little tndlcatlon of 
heroin or coca.tne use. Both the law enforce-
ment pel'SOnnel and the medical personnel 
had had very little contact with these drugs. 
Regardless of location, marihuana and 
hashish usually ts smoked In pipes or ciga-
rette !onn. In VIetnam, the marihuana ciga-
rettes are sometimes filled with Red Rock 
heroin and amoked. The amphetamines and 
barbiturates are generally taken orally but 
occasionally they are Injected Intravenously. 
Heroin Is generally smoked (sniffed) by be-
ginners and Injected by heavy users. 
It Is Important to note that most of the 
regular or heavy users are multiple drug 
users. They will substitute one drug for an-
other It avallabutty Is a problem or wlll use 
a variety of drugs to meet their emotional 
needs. The takers of amphetamines will use 
barbiturates to come down off their high. 
Most of the users of hallucinogenic drugs 
such as LSD or STP also used marihuana. 
c. When and where drugs are being used 
It ts difficult to disagree with the Im-
pression of an Army psych1atrlst who says 
that "the use of drugs and alcohol can oc-
cur anywhere at any time." However, It Is our 
general Impression that It Ia more likely to 
occur on off-duty hours whether In the 
United states or abroad. It Is also likely to 
occur awo.y from the military post. 
The most crucial question on time and 
place of use concerns the use of drugs In 
combat. In VIetnam, commanders universally 
told the staff that, because of the personal 
danger Involved, there was !e..r less smoking 
of marihuana In combat areas than In rear 
support aroos. The same wae stated by com-
manders to the Department of Defense Drug 
Abuse Oontrol Committee Task Force headed 
by Jerome A. Vacek of the Marine Corp.; 
during Its vtslt there In the !all of 1970. We 
were told that there was considerable self-
policing among the troops while in combat 
areas because they did not want to endanger 
themselves or be endangered by another who 
might be "high" at a crLtlca.l moment. How-
ever, there Is evidence to contradict this. 
Wh1le he did not approach the question 
head-on, Stanton found "a slight pQSitlve 
correlation ... between marihuana use and 
combat exposure." Wh1le thts ahows that 
combat experienced troops probably were 
those who had the greatest marihuana ex-
perlen~. It does not necessarily Indicate t hat 
they used It whUe actually In combat. 
Postel's study also indicates the same thing 
but adds that the u sage came after combat 
"to calm down." Treanor and Sltrlpol like-
wise found apparently Increased usage with 
field-type duty; far greater numbers reported 
usage at large and small "LZ forward areas" 
than numbers reporting usage at "rear sup-
port areas." Reinforcing this was their fur-
ther finding that an overwhelming majority 
of regular users (once weekly to once dally or 
more frequently) thought that marihuana 
should be permitted on ftre-basee either dur-
Ing off-duty hours or whenever the Indi-
vidual chooses. Other Individuals Indicated 
In person to the staff that they had used 
marihuana In combat situations. 
As noted above, the use of drugs at Ft. 
Bragg takes place primarily In rented "pads" 
away from the base and on off-duty hours. 
In VIetnam and Thailand, It Is likely that 
most use takes place away from established 
posts because of avallablllty of drugs and 
the likelihood of nondetectlon off post. 
In the career context, Treanor and Skrlpol 
found the highest Incidence of marihuana 
usage during the first two or three years 
of a soldier's m1lltary service. They a lso re-
ported that apparently there Is a slight In-
crease In usage as the first tour progresses, 
but not with those on extensions. 
As for VIetnam, Stanton found that the 
probability was greatest that I! a man was 
going to start using marihuana there, he 
would begin In the first three months, or 
certainly In the first six months. Conversely, 
amp)letamlnes showed the opposite trend, 
with more enlisted men beginning use as 
their tour progressed. 
D. Why drugs are being used 
The ·reasons which have been presented 
to us as to why drugs are being used by 
young men In the m1lltary !all Into two gen-
eral ca tegorles. First, there are those which 
lie with the Individual himself. Second, there 
are the external factors which arise In the 
Individual's environment. The former are re-
lated to his ab1llty to deal with his situation 
and the latter are those which place burdens 
upon him which he must deal with. If his 
ability to deal with environmental stresses 
Is Inadequate, or If the burdens of stress 
which the environment places upon him are 
unusual, the Individual user will take one 
of the drugs available to help him cope with 
the situation. 
As mentioned earlier, the habitual drug 
user Is likely to be young, have a low edu-
cation, come from a broken home, and have 
psychological and emotional problems which 
lead him t~ conftlct In whatever society he 
happens to be ln. These are Individuals with 
a low self-esteem who are unable to meet 
most life situations. Other Individual rea-
sons presented to us are related to the atti-
tudes held by many of the age-group !rom 
which the typical drug user comes. These 
tnclude the following: ( 1) youth, being "now" 
oriented, are Impatient and frustrated by 
the gradual process of social change; (2) 
middle-class youth reject the life goals of 
affiuance and prestige held by their elders; 
(3) lower-class and minority youth are Im-
patient and frustrated with the disparity be-
tween their goals and perceived opportuni-
ties to attain them "now," and they see the 
Establishment as trying to block them; (4) 
young people "get hung up somewhere along 
the developmental line" toward maturity, 
with a conflict developing between depend-
ency and autonomy; (5) .drugs are a means 
of acting-out behavior disapproved of by 
parents or the senior generation and thus 
help to concretely distinguish the "self" from 
Establishment norms. The latter point seems 
to be particularly valid In regards to the 
troops In Germany. There we found, to a 
greater degree than In VIetnam, an attitude 
of division between the enlisted or drafted 
lower rank soldiers and the "lifer" NCO's and 
officers. Perhaps these troops are using drugs 
as a means of setting themselves off !rom 
the older and higher-ranking personnel who 
use alcohol as their social drug. 
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Other !actors He with the environment ln 
which the young soldier finds hlmselt. Pres-
sures are put upon hlm which are difficult 
to cope with. Prime among these ls the lack 
of sense of value which many soldiers feel 
about their job. Treanor and Skrlpol found 
that job dlssatlsfactlon seemed to correlate 
with marihuana use. This factor was also 
cited among many of the returned troops 
wh o h ave several months of stateside duty 
left b&!ore d ischarge. These men are given 
unfulfill1ng tasks to do whlle waiting out 
their time. This !actor appeared to be partic-
ularly acute In Korea and Germany where 
there ls 11 ttle or no actual combat. Since the 
troop units there must be combat-ready, 
there Is apparently much routine work aimed 
at preparing tor Inspections. A jeep driver 
ln Germany, tor example, told us that h ls 
only consistent job during the three months 
In adv-ance of a unlt-wlde vehicle inspection 
was to "maintain" his own vehicle. A pla-
toon leader said the only time the morale 
of his troops seemed to 11ft was when they 
were preparing to go on a tough training 
exercise, which was infrequently. There was 
widespread grlplng about the many "make 
work" jobs that troops were being given 
to do. 
In Vietnam, stress from combat was cited 
as a factor. It was felt that some troops used 
drugs, particularly ma.rlhuana, to unwind or 
relax after combat. This ls accentuated when 
the soldier moves from a stressful situation 
to a combat lull where only routine work Is 
required of hlm. 
Another Important external factor Is peer 
group pressure. There were lndlcatlons that 
peer group pressure "to be one of the boys" 
was strong. The young man, placed In a new 
situation, seeking to establ1sh hls own iden-
tity, looks to join a group ln which he wlll 
get approval and support. He may be trying 
to feel Independent of his elders' authority 
and so when the group pressures hlm to con-
form by trying drugs, he finds lt hard to 
resist. We heard reports of Individuals being 
threatened li they did not conform to drug 
usage patterns but were unable to verify 
any of these. 
We learned of several factors which tend 
to enhance the peer group situation. We 
were told that the non-commissioned officers 
generally dld not 11ve among their troops In 
barracks areas. The older "lifer" non-com-
missioned officer was regarded very negatively 
by the young soldiers. There was apparently 
little ldentltlcatlon of the young soldier with 
the older, non-commlssloned officers. Con-
tributing to this problem ls the tact that 
many of the young soldiers were coming from 
a sub-culture ln clvlllan 11fe which accepts 
the use of drugs. They not only would want 
to perpetuate their llle style but would re-
sent and resist those who might prevent 
them from 11vlng lt. 
Another factor Is the lack of acceptable 
alternatives to drug use to meet either stress 
or boredom. The soldier ln VIetnam has little 
or no way of dealing with his frustration In 
any constructive fashion. Most towns a.re otr-
11mits and those that are not a.re limited In 
what they have to otfer. The primary activity 
when they are permitted oft' the p06t Is 
drinking ln the loca.l bars and meeting with 
local women, most of whom are prostitutes. 
In Germany, the opportunities !or meeting 
local girls are somewht Improved !or white 
soldiers but an obvious problem eXists for 
blacks who are also barred from certain Ger-
man-operated "white only" discotheques. In 
Vietnam, recrea.tlona.I facUlties are generally 
una.V'a.llable and are advocated a.s a.n alterna-
tive to drug abuse. However, it Is question-
able 1! these would be used, since In Ger-
many we were told that there ls a general 
lack of troop interest 1n recreational a.ctlvl-
tles ava.llable---playlng basketball, skiing, 
academic courses, even three-day expense-
pa.ld excursions. 
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ln t.vuc.ra.s~ l ..... his picture Js the experi-
ence of the Air For,· !n Vietnam and espe-
clally tn Thalla.nd. Th~ extent ot drug use 
was reported to be decidedly lower among 
the Alr Force men a.t the four be.ses we 
visited In Thailand. The command personnel 
gave evidence that both arrest and medical 
statistics were much lower. The reasons 
which they gave !or this lower use might be 
instructive: they stated that the typical air-
man tends to be older than the soldier; 
nearly all are high school graduates with a 
significant number having some college ex-
perience; they tend to identity with the m111-
tary; they have good self-esteem; and they 
feel that they have something to lose If they 
use drugs. They also sa.ld that ln Thalland, 
airmen were working a. 12-hour-a.-day, 7-
days-a-week schedule and were doing tasks 
of a higher cal1ber. (In Thailand much of 
the more mental-type tasks are performed by 
local natives.) The Air Force personnel are 
said to have a high sense of job satisfaction 
whether they are flying or are engaged In 
maintenance work: the tllght crews !eel more 
worthwhlle because they are engaged ln a 
task they fee! Is significant. 
Other factors cited by the Air Force In-
c! ude a higher ra.tllo ot officers and non-
commissloned officers to enlisted personnel. 
This ls sa.ld to give the alrman a. closer iden-
tification with the "Establ15hment." Also 
advanced as opera.tlve to keep Air Force 
usage down Is the selectivity !actor. It Is felt 
by the Air Force that 1 t gets a. better grade 
person both In motivation and ability than 
does the Army. The Alr Force has no draftees. 
The Alr Force also contends that further 
selectivity operatee within lts ranks ln deter-
mining tne kind of man who is sent to 
Southeast Asia. Command In Thailand 
claimed that the cream of the Air Force 
crop was being selected to serve 1n South-
east Asia because of the Importance ot their 
mission there. The Oommand ln Thailand 
also attributed their reputed lower incidence 
rate to the easy accesslblllty or alcohol and 
local women. It appeared that while the drug 
use rate might be low, the V.D. rate was 
high. 
Another !actor which may mllltate against 
drug abuse ln some situations ls the so-
called "buddy" system. The Marines and 
Navy command personnel we spoke with ln 
Vietnam and the Army ln Thalland felt 
that the encouragement or close ties with 
another lndlvldual for the purpose of mutual 
support and concern helped stop drug abuse 
before lt began. This ls a positive variation 
at the peer-group pressure factor. In this 
instance a peer situation with anti-drug use 
values ls encouraged. If one lndlvldual In 
the pair ls sutl'erlng unusual stress or bore-
dom, he has another lndlvldual with whom 
he can share hls burden. This gives some 
relle! so that crlsls can be met without re-
sort to drugs. We dld not have an oppor-
tunity to look at this system directly and 
hence cannot give any independent evalua-
tion. It does, however, appear to have at 
least theoretical value In terms of action 
to be taken to combat drug abuse. 
III . THE IMPACT OF DRUG ABUSE 
The stalf has attempted to access the Im-
pact or effect which drug abuse ls having 
upon the lndlvldual mllltary man, upon the 
Armed Services, upon American society a.s 
a whole and upon the various rei a tlonshlps 
that exist between lndlvlduals and groups In 
the military. We looked tor signs of break-
down which would point to remedial meas-
ures and looked tor trends or directions 
which would suggest preventive actions 
which might be taken. 
A . The impact on the individual 
The medical etl'ects or drug abuse upon 
the lndlvldual ln the mllltary do not seem 
to vary substantially from those reported In 
the clvl!lan community. Marihuana pro-
duces a range of etl'ects which include mlld 
euphoria, mlld time-space distortions, hal-
lucinatory episodes and delusion ideation. 
Those who are turning up at medical !a.clll-
tles with adverse reactions to marihuana are 
generally those who suffer anxiety reactions 
when they first use the drug. Their condi-
tion lasts for a very short period and Is 
normally cleared up ln 24-72 hours. The 
reaction seems to be dependent upon the 
state or mind or the user rather -than upon 
the elfect or the drug. It Is likely to occur 
ln an lndlvldual who has gullt feelings about 
the use of marihuana and ls apprehensive 
about being arrested or caught. A very few 
Instances of persistent conditions, psychotic 
states and violence were also reported. How-
ever, these seem to Involve lndlvlduals with 
deeper, more long-standing psychologlcal 
conditions of which drug abuse ls merely 
one manifestation of the problem. Many of 
these situations involved persons who were 
using marihuana on a heavy basis every day 
over a considerable period or time. The num-
ber or the nature of these cases did not seem 
to be sufficient to justify a conclusion that 
marihuana causes lasting psychosis or 
violence ln users. 
An interesting phenomenon reported was 
tho "marihuana. ftoshback." A flashback Is 
commonly assoclated only with LSD 'llsa.ge. 
Several doctors reported that they had had 
patients Who clalmed having fta.shba.cks a.tter 
use only or marihuana. Theo;e fla.Sh.backs 
were described as being reoccurrences of 
prior experiences whlle under the J.nfiuen.ce 
or the drug. They were desert bed as occur-
mg In moments ol stress as lf the mlnd was 
lnvolunta.rlly reaching back tor a plea.sa.n.t 
experience· while under Intolerable ·pressure 
ot the moment. However, the subject can ap-
parently be brought out or the fta.shback by 
someone talking to him and telllng him to 
return to the present moment. There were no 
reports ot deaths or permanent physical 
damage !rom the use of marihuana. among 
milltary personnel. The mlllta.ry medical per-
sonnel also regularly reported that ma.ri-
huana Is non-addlctlve ln terms or physical 
dependence but that users could a.nd dld be-
come dependent upon Its use In rthe psycho-
loglcal or behavioral sense. Medical officers 
also felt that marihuana does not In Itself 
lead to the use of harder drugs. This Is sup-
ported by the Black, Owens, and Wolf!' study 
which reported : "It should be noted that, al-
though lnltlal experiences With ma.rihuana 
tend to lead to continued use, iOUU"ihuana 
usage does not lead most lndlviduais into ex-
perimentation with heroin. The belle! that 
marihuana use Is dangerous because It pre-
disposes toward heroin is fallacious, al-
though It ls true that nearly all the heroin 
users in the present study had also used 
marihuana." Other studies also support this 
conclusion and indicate that While there is 
no causal relationship between marihuana 
use and opiate use, most habitual opiate 
users have been heavy marihuana users first. 
Another Important f.a.ctor which was re-
ported to us is that the etfects ot h&shit.h 
use in Germany do not seem to be any more 
severe or extreme than the etl'ects of mari-
huana smoked ln either the United States or 
ln Vietnam. The medical stat!' of the hDspl-
tals we visited ln Germany reported that the 
cases Involving marihuana W'hJ,ch required 
medical or psychological treatment were no 
more severe than they had seen 1n other 
locales including some In the continental 
U.S. This was true even though the general 
impression is that the THC content ot 
hashish ls higher than marihuana alone. 
The reason for this may be ln the psycho-
logical state or mlnd of the users and 1n the 
settmg in which mArihuana. ls used. Also im-
portant Is the ablllty of t!he experienced 
smoker of either marihuana or hashish to 
control his level ot lntoxlcatlon. TO explain 
further, the etl'ects or cannabis use seem to 
depend to a great degree upon the subjective 
state or the user. If he goes into the expert-
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ence expecting and desiring a pleasant, 
mildly euphoric e>qHJrlence with no negative 
elfects and he Is doing this ln a social setting 
with fellow users who are compe.tlble and 
who desire the same kind o! experience, hts 
expectations wlll likely be realized. In addi-
tion, because the active Ingredient Is taken 
In through the lungs the quickest way to 
get It Into the bloodstream, the user Is able 
to control or "fine tune" his level of Intoxi-
cation. When he feels hlmsel! getting too 
high he ca.n relax for a while a.nd not smoke 
any more untn he starts to come down. Thls 
control by the smoker enables hlm to keep 
the Intoxication wlthln a manageable range 
and avoid adverse reactions. Neither the 
military nor the Bureau o! Narcotics W1l.S able 
to supply us with an a.nalysls of the hashish 
being used In Germany. It Is possible that 
the product bought by the oonsumer Is so 
cut wlth adultemnts that the 'I'HC content 
Is lower than In straight marihuana. 
One of the drugs with the greatest lmpact 
upon Individuals, In medical terms Is heroin. 
It Is physically addicting when taken reg-
ularly and In sufficient doses. However, we 
received mixed reports as to the severity of 
the addiction. Many doctors reported that 
they saw very few cases o! classic withdrawal 
symptoms In patients who claim the use of 
heroin. The snllfers of Red Rock heroin were 
reported not to have become severely ad-
dicted. This was also true or some of the 
Injectors of refined heroin. However, the 
heroin of 97 percent purity available In VIet-
nam Is particularly dangerous, Inasmuch 
as It wlll likely lead to frequent occurence 
of overdoses and death even In experienced 
hands. Heroin use Is also likely to lead to 
secondary medical complications such as 
serum hepatitis !rom unsterile needles. 
The opium native to VIetnam Is o! such 
poor quality that In all but one case ob-
served by an experienced mllltary psychia-
trist, withdrawal symptoms were mild. The 
exception Involved an Individual who had 
taken 2 cc. Intravenously !our times a day 
and whose abstinence-withdrawal presented 
serious problems. Ar.other serious result of 
opium use which occurs occasionally comes 
from mixing It with marihuana In cigarettes. 
This synergistic or multiple elfect of the two 
drugs together can exceed the expectation of 
the user and present him with a reaction 
with which he cannot cope. 
Deaths from heroin abuse or overdose In 
VIetnam are Increasing. For the entire calen-
dar year of 1969, only 16 deaths !rom drugs 
were reported : 5 !rom chloroquine (used to 
prevent malaria), 4 !rom barbltuates, 3 !rom 
Darvon, 3 !rom morphine or heroin, 1 !rom 
opium. During the nine-month period Janu-
ary-October 1970, however, the number of 
deaths had already more than doubled to 
34: 2 !rom chloroquine, 5 !rom barbltuates 
3 from Darvon, and 26 !rom heroin-morphine: 
It will be seen that heroin or morphine has 
become the most frequently used lethal 
agent. 
One additional significant elfect which 
drug abuse may have on an Individual soldier 
Is the role which drugs may come to play In 
his ll!e. Those Individuals who are unable 
to cope with ll!e and turn to drugs may 
end up relying on drugs as the core of their 
lite. When this occurs the lndl vidual looes 
Interest In other aspects o! his life and 
devotes most o! his time to the procurement 
of drugs and to their "enjoyment." This mod-
Ification o! behavior wlll likely lead this 
type of user into conflict with the military 
community and consequently he Is likely 
to have to !ace legal or disciplinary action. 
While the Individual who becomes a heavy 
user or Is psychologically or physically ha-
bituated to drug use may come to the at-
ten tlon o! legal au thor! ties, 1 t Is the con-
elusion o! the stalf that the lllegal!ty o! 
marihuana use does not have a slgnltlcant 
Impact upon the great majority o! marihuana 
smokers In the rnllltary. It clearly does not 
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have a deterrent elfect. The Illegality or 
marihuana use has been widely publicized 
within and without the military. Indeed, one 
of the major thrusts o! military drug educa-
tion Is to stress the legal consequences of 
marihuana use. We believe that the lack o! 
deterrent elfect exists !or several reasons. 
First Is the basic attitude o! young Ameri-
cans toward marihuana use. Unlike many o! 
the senior generation, many young Ameri-
cans Including those In the mllltary do not 
regard the use o! marlh uana as a moral q ues-
tlon. They do not see the user o! marihuana 
as a "bad" or "Immoral" person. They be-
lieve that marihuana should be legalized and 
Its use lett up to the lndlvt~ual . They also 
do not regard the elfects o! marihuana as 
detrimental to their health or to their func-
tioning. Many o! them regard marliluana as 
a social drug to be used for relaxation and 
as superior to alcohol !or this purpose be-
cause It does not leave the user with a hang-
over. 
B. The impact upon the military 
We did not find that the use of drugs has 
a significant direct Impact upon the military 
mission of the Armed Services. While we 
were made aware o! rare, Isolated Instances 
where marihuana had been used In combat 
situations In VIetnam, we saw no evidence 
that any mission or operation had been 
jeopardized by d'rug use. VIrtually every com-
mander to whom the Subcommittee stalf put 
the question stated unequivocally and cate-
gorically that drug use has not adversely 
alfected military elfectlvenes or the military 
mission o! his unit. 
However, It Is clear that drug abuse does 
Impose an Indirect but significant burden 
upon the entire military community and 
organization. There Is a relationship between 
drug use and manifestations or social and 
behavioral disorganization such as AWOL, 
sleeping on the job, !allure to appear tor 
duty, disrespect, Indebtedness, and unhealthy 
and unclean living habits. or these, Gen-
eral John J. Tolson, the Commanding Gen-
eral of Fort Bragg, singled out AWOL's say-
Ing, "It Is bound to cut down eventually In 
your strength figures." although he added 
that the problem at his base had not reached 
such proportions "that as units they are 
not capable o! performing their job." 
The military community Is also affected 
by the fact that the military drug user Is 
often unable to pay !or his habit !rom his 
normal Income. While this Is not often 
troublesome In VIetnam where an drugs are 
available at low prices, at continental United 
States bases, crime to support drug abuse Is 
a problem. Theft of Government property, 
Including weapons, to support habits Is 
known to occur. "Today," General Tolson 
observed, "you hal'e to secure your arms 
rooms and supply rooms on a scope that you 
never had to do before ... and still, If you 
don't have guards actually there, thieves 
wlll break Into them." 
One of the most critical elfects of the 
growth of drug abuse among the mill tary Is 
In the growth of a counter or sub-cultur~ 
within the military centered around drug 
use. This alfects both the individuals In-
volved and the mllltary community Itself. 
Because smoking marihuana and hashish are 
social activities, the users tend to group tc . 
gether for the purpose o! drug use. The me-
gall ty o! drug use also tends to force the user 
into a particular group of his drug using 
peers. This Is true whether the use Is occa-
sional or Is on a regular basis. Part of the 
mystique of smoking "grass" Is to gather 
together with others to enjoy the experience. 
The !llegallty of use, In elfect. cuts olf the 
user from leg! tlmate sources o! support and 
help with his problems-whether directly 
cconected with drug use or ot another 
nature- and he can, therefore, look only to 
those in his peer group for emotional sup-
port. 
This Is a~gravated because so many of the 
young military men coming Into the services 
today, do not Identify with the value system 
of the senior generation. They tend to form 
peer groups !or all activities rather than in-
teract with command personnel. This Is fur-
ther enhanced In the m!lltary because It Is 
organized upon a hierarchial basis. In Ger-
many more than In Vietnam the sense o! sep-
aration between the enlisted man or lower 
ranks !rom the non-commissioned officets 
and the commissioned officers was apparent. 
In !act, In Germany we felt a great host!llty 
between the one-tour soldier and the so-
called "lifer." In VIetnam this was less so, 
probably because o! the common sense of ur-
gency !aced by both groups. However we 
were told In several places that young troop-
ers had a more positive relationship with 
NCO's and officers of their own age. This was 
attributed to the tact that these Individuals, 
while occupying positions o! authority over 
the troops, shared many of the same values of 
the enlisted men, particularly in regard to 
the smoking o! marihuana as a social activ-
ity. Some senior officers felt that some of the 
junior officers right out or college share those 
values and hence did not take action on 
marihuana use among their troops. 
Another manifestation or the sub-culture 
problem is lllustrated by the example of a 
~cond lieutenant at the Wlldtllcken outpost 
In Germany. This platoon leader told a Sub-
committee Investigator o! his tears o! ven-
turing Into the barracks at night, where he 
might be slugged I! he came upon a "pot 
party" (as had happened to a fellow officer.) 
The existence of a sub-culture also causes 
general disruption. A squadron commander 
at Bad Kisslngen, Germany, reported, "It's 
not the smoking that causes m!llta.ry ln-
etrectlveness; It's the rarnltlcatlons of the 
distribution system-the competition among 
pushers who fluctuate the price, put guys 
In debt. and cause disciplinary problems. 
commit assaults and so on." 
A more tangible impact upon the rnllitary 
caused by the Increase in drug abuse is the 
burden which It places upon the various ele-
ments o! the military society. Because o! the 
!llegality o! drug abuse the primary burden 
Is placed upon the law enforcement branches 
o! the rnllitary. The allocation or manpower 
and monetary resources by the provost mar-
shal to drug problems is significant. For ex-
ample, In Fiscal Year 1970, 27 per cent o! 
all Army CID Investigations in Europe were 
"drug-related." However, while the law en-
forcement branches have devoted a signif-
Icant amount o! their resources to stopping 
drug abuse, we were universally told that 
their activities were limited and not suf-
ficient to make any significant impact upon 
!llegal drug activity. Their operations are 
hampered by difficulties In teaching com-
mand personnel to make legal searches and 
seizures, by the length o! time necessary 
for laboratory verification of !llegal drugs, 
and by the dlfficul ty In establishing a legal 
chain o! custody. 
Because of the dlfficul ty in enforcing the 
law. particularly with regard to marlh\lana 
use. the law does not have any etrectlve de-
terrent elfect and the Impression is given to 
the users that use Is tacitly accepted by com-
mand. This leads to disrespect for the law and 
In elfect crates a double standard. While we 
were not made aware or any cases, we do note 
that the lnab!llty to enforce the law In all 
cases gives rise to the possib!llty o! selec-
tive enforcement for reasons unrelated to 
drug abuse. 
The medical personnel in the m!lltary are 
under many o! the same pressures as those 
In the law enforcement branch. There has 
been an Increased case load upon all mili-
tary doctors. A number o! senior doctors a.re 
unprepared to deal with drug abuse because 
they were trained In an era when it was 
much less common. The activities of the 
military doctor Include many duties other 
than treatment. A heavy demand Is made 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 47, Folder 32, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
upon military doctors, particularly psychi-
atrists, to establish, promote, and participate 
In drug abuse education programs. The mili-
tary psychiatrists must make evaluations 
of many troopers charged with crimes and 
this Includes evaluations on the users of 
drugs. In addition, military doctors are 
scheduled to play a large role In the amnesty 
program which will be discussed later In the 
report. These functions place a burden upon 
doctors who are already overburdened be-
cause of a reportedly Inordinate reduction of 
medical personnel In relation to the reduc-
tion of other U.S. military personnel. This 
Is a serious problem because military doctors 
are faced with an Increase In drug abuse 
for which there are few, It any, proven meth-
ods of treatment ava.llable. 
The Increase In drug abuse has placed a 
concomitant load upon all other elements 
of the military structure, particularly the 
command personnel and the judge advocate 
staff._ They are called upon to process the 
cases of accused drug users and also are an 
Integral part of the military drug abuse edu-
cation activities. Their specific activities will 
be shown In greater detail later In the report. 
C. The tmpa.ct upon Amertcan soctety 
The Subcommittee staff believes that the 
greatest Impact upon society as o. Whole lies 
In the Integration of military drug users Into 
their local communities upon release from 
service. While the Indications of drug abuse 
are not significantly different In the military 
or In civilian society, the likelihood of Identi-
fication of drug users In the mill tary Is great-
er. Many drug addicts and users With mal-
adjustment problems are being returned 
from military service Identified as drug users, 
but unrehabllltated. For exa.mple, adminis-
trative separations for "characterologic In-
effectiveness" rose 119 per cent from fiscal 
year 1969 to fiscal year 1970, from 12,726 to 
27,837. Many or these separations were for 
drug use. In addition, the Veterans Adminis-
tration has Indicated that there are sharp 
Increases In the number of veterans, partic-
ularly under age 25, who are being treated 
for drug addiction and dependency problems. 
Since much or the serious drug a.buse Is 
accompanied by emotional or psychological 
problems requiring lengthy treatment, those 
released from the military With histories of 
drug use will have to find treatment sources 
In civilian society. It they are unable to do 
so, they will place an obvious burden on 
other segments of society, particularly the 
law enforcement segment. Returning vet-
erans with drug histories also have difficulty 
In finding employment. Fifty business firms 
who were asked by Fort Bragg officials about 
their policies toward a. man with an un-
desirable discharge or a. known drug abuser 
replied universally that neither would be 
considered favorable for employment. 
IV. HOW IS DRUG ABUSE BEING HANDLED 
The question of how to handle drugs and 
drug users In the military Is primarily being 
met With a. law enforcement approach. This 
effort Is aimed at reducing the supply of 
Illicit drugs, at eliminating drug pushers and 
users where detected, and at providing a. 
negative Incentive for the use of drugs. Sec-
ond priority Is given to treatment and reha-
bilitation of those using drugs. The lowest 
priority Is given to activities which would 
lead to reduced demand for drugs. 
A. Law enforcement 
The prime objective of the law enforce-
ment efforts Is to Identify drug pushers and 
traffickers and therefore halt or diminish the 
supply. As noted above, there Is little Indi-
cation of concerted elforts to seek out and 
arrest users or possessors. In VIetnam and 
Thailand most possessors were Initially 
picked up for other disciplinary violations. 
In Germany command Indicated that while 
most drug arrests were for possession or use, 
they were not specifically looking for users. 
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There, the greatest number of arrests of users 
were made as a result of Infiltrating a whole 
group of users and not just arresting Indi-
viduals. 
Because of their relatively small numbers 
and for jurisdictional reasons, military law 
enforcement personnel often must rely upon 
other agencies In trying to shut off the sup-
ply of drugs to U.S. forces. The principal 
agency relied upon for overall activities, both 
here and abroad, Is the Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs. Insofar as military 
bases In this country are concrened, BNDD 
Director John E. Ingersoll told the Subcom-
mittee "The current 'systems' approach of 
BNDD Is aimed at major Interstate and In-
terns tiona. I drug traffickers, and hence, the 
drug problem on large military reservations 
such as Fort Bragg Is left largely to the mili-
tary and local authorities concerned." In 
the U.S. the BNDD forces provide Informa-
tion and support rather than actual enforce-
ment for mill tary bases. 
In the U.S., coordination with local and 
state authorities Is essential because apart 
from those pushers or dealers apprehended 
on the military base, military law enforce-
ment personnel do not have jurisdiction off 
base. However, we found good two-way co-
operation In gathering and supplying Infor-
mation so that Illegal activities that cross 
Jurisdictional lines could be halted. 
In September 1970, BNDD assigned a. senior 
official to a permanent liaison position With 
the Department of Defense. According to 
BNDD Director Ingersoll, this agent partici-
pates In all Defense Department activities 
concerned With drug abuse and support to 
the military needs. Overseas, a BNDD senior 
agent stationed at MACV Headquarters In 
Saigon works directly with the military and 
a. similar agent more recently was assigned 
to Frankfurt, Germany. In addition BNDD 
has regional supervisors In Bangkok, Thai-
land and Paris, France. Other agents are lo-
cated In other oountrles such as Hong Kong, 
Japan, Turkey and Lebanon. These agents 
work with military pollee agents In exchang-
Ing Information and In setting up covert ac-
tivities aimed at penetrating Illegal drug 
groups. 
In Vietnam, the BNDD agent there has 
worked closely With the military and the AID 
agency to establish a program to locate and 
destroy marihuana crops. This has Included 
the training of VIetnamese pollee In drug ac-
tivities and the development of a squad of 
special narcotics pollee In the VIetnamese po-
llee force. The program consisted of hell-
copter reconnaissance flights to locate mari-
huana growth. After the discovery of a field, 
VIetnamese pollee would move Into the area 
and destroy the plants by uprooting and 
burning. In 1969, some 500,000 plants were 
eradicated In VIetnam under this program. 
The program decreased In 1970, due to what 
Ingersoll called "higher combat priorities." 
He said, In addition , that the Army felt that 
surveillance which had to be conducted at 
low altitude and slow speed was too hazard-
ous In areas of potential hostility. While 
bounties are now paid for reporting mari-
huana growth, the program has not had the 
same degree of success as only 68,000 plants 
were destroyed through most of 1970. More 
recently, the military has undertaken photo 
!lights with fixed-wing aircraft that can de-
tect growth at safe speeds and safe altl tudes. 
Local cooperaltlon wl th nat! ve pollee, par-
ticularly In VIetnam, Is another activity 
of the military law enforcement agencies. 
This does not seem to be a successful program 
because of the acceptance of opiate drug use 
by tne natives, their feeling that marihuana 
Is not their problem, local political Involve-
ment and corruption, general antipathy to-
ward cultural change, Inadequate legislation , 
and the local economic situation. In VIet-
nam for example, the average dally wage Is 
about $.85 American . If a VIetnamese sells 
two packages of prepared marihuana. cigar-
ettes at $1.50 each, he will have made over 3 
times the loca.l dally wage. This makes It diffi-
cult for local enforcement agencies to take 
action. 
In Germany, the cooperation with local 
pollee seems to be satisfactory. However, 
there appears to be less than close liaison 
between the CID and the BNDD agent In 
Frankfurt. Local command was attempting 
to overcome this problem by developing closer 
ties on that level. The CID In Germany makes 
great use of undercover or covert agents. 
This has led to the arrest of several large 
groups of pushers and users. The CID esti-
mates that It Is Intercepting 20 percent of 
the Illicit trafficking In drugs bound for 
American troops In Germany. 
Also used by military law enforcement au-
thorities are marihuana sniffing dogs. On the 
Asia. trip, we heard quite often about the 
marihuana dogs and their value. However, 
It appears that their actual use Is limited 
and not very efficient. Whenever we asked to 
see a dog we ran Into scheduling difficulties 
or w~re told that the dogs had worked their 
allotted time (usually one-half to one hour) 
and were unavailable. While we suspect their 
actual detect ion value, they are probably 
justified by the deterrent effect their reputa-
tion has. 
Because of the great amount of drugs avail-
able, particularly In Southeast Asia, we do 
not feel that the law enforcement activities 
mentioned above will be able to make any 
significant Impact on the drug distribution 
system. However, we do feel that continued 
efforts aimed at pusher and major trafficking 
organizations are necessary and should be 
continued. 
B. Education efforts 
Education activities In all commands fall 
Into two categories, command training and 
troop education. The command training ac-
tivities center around giving command per-
sonnel sufficient factual Information to en-
able them to oarry out their legal and dis-
ciplinary functions. Emphasis Is placed on 
detection of drug use and subsequent disci-
plinary action. Command education Is gen-
erally carried out through Drug Suppression 
Teams, consisting of medical, legal, law en-
forcement and perhaps chaplain officers. 
Primary Importance Is placed on the Iden-
tification of drugs, drug paraphernalia, drug 
use symptoms, and drug user behavior pat-
terns. Command personnel, particularly the 
junior officers and senior non-commissioned 
officers are Instructed In the techniques of 
proper searches and seizures, maintaining 
the chain of custody, and the action to be 
taken upon apprehension of offenders. While 
this educational approach may be useful In 
meeting the legal responsibilities of the 
military, we feel that It does little toward 
achieving true prevention of. drug abuse. 
Education which will enable command per-
sonnel to understand the causes of drug 
abuse and to dea.l with the troops before they 
begin drug abuse Is generally lacking. Senior 
officers a!lld NCO's appear to be the groups 
most needing this type of education. General 
Tolson of Fort Bragg stated, for example, "It 
appeared obvious to me at the very beginning 
that If we were going to get anywhere In our 
education, In our dialog With the young sol-
dier, the man we were really interested In, 
there had to be a real understanding by the 
senior officers and non-commissioned officers 
on the drug culture and Its problems. They 
were my number one target to educate." 
Military regulations, Including those Is-
sued by the DOD and the various services re-
quire that all military personnel periodically 
receive orientation concerning drug abuse. 
The form a!lld substance of this orientation 
varies from unit to unlt and, to the knowl-
edge of the Suboommittee staff, has never 
been evaluated, except Informally, for Its 
value In deterring drug use. This orientation 
runs the gamut from the shoWing of a 
film M1d the reading of prepared lectnre 
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materia.! to more Imaginative give-and-take 
"rap" sessions. In many commands the Drug 
Suppression Team does the orientation to 
the troops. occasionally adding a former user 
to the Team. From what llttle feedback Is 
being received on the commam.d level, tWs ap-
proach was genera.! I y not elfect! ve. This was 
amrmed by Individual soldiers who com-
plained that the presentations tended to be 
too lega.J!st!c and used scare tactl!cs. It Is our 
Impression that the presence of the Provost 
Marshal on the team. while mer!trullous In a 
situation Involving command personnel, Is 
not warranted when the target gtoup Is 
younger o!fi~ers or troops. In fact, the pres-
ence o! the "cop" on the ~ acts to tum 
the young troops against the panel's activi-
ties. Surprisingly. this view wss accepted by 
several of the Provost Marshals we talked 
with. 
Other ed ucat!ona.J act! vi ties Inc! ude radio 
and T.V. spots and films. The evaluatlon of 
thesse troops we ta.lked to was genera.Jly nega-
tive. The best educ81t!ona.J device we have 
seen was a training road show In Germany. 
TWs play was written by enlisted men in the 
language and style of enlisted men and per-
formed by enl!sted men, moot of whom had 
previous show business experience. The staff 
was genuinely Impressed by the emotional 
Impact of this production. It UJtlllzed rock 
music and visual effeets with which the 
trooper could Identify. Because of this we felt 
Its credib!l!ty and value was outstanding. 
The credibility problem underl!es all of 
the m1ll tary ed ucwt!ona.J efforts directed to-
ward the young soldier. The con1l!ct!ng In-
formation presented both In and out of the 
m!l!tary about marihuana has undermined 
the cred!b!l!ty of the better prepared and sci-
entifically accurate efforts being made now. 
However. tWs Is being overcome with valid 
Information presented by medical omcers. 
C. Treatment and rehabtlitation 
Treatment and rehab!l!tat!on or drug 
abusers In the m!l!tary cannot be discussed 
without considering the so-called amnesty 
program. This program. In what ever form It 
may. take In any particular command, Is a 
combination of legal, medical and adminis-
trative approaches to drug abuse. Its gen-
eral purpose Is to provide an atmosphere In 
which a drug abusing soldier can feel free to 
come forth and get medical and psychologi-
cal help to overcome his drug use. 
Experimentation with amnesty programs In 
the Army began as long ago as February, 
1968, when such a program was esta.bl!shed 
by the 4th Infantry Division In VIetnam. 
Others were establ!shed on a command level, 
all of which were In violation of existing 
Army regulations. One or the most note-
worthy or these Is "Operation Awareness" at 
Fort Bragg which was begun In May 1970, 
and undertakes to treat and rehab!l!tate the 
users of hard as well as soft drugs. Regula-
tions have now been established by the Army 
and DOD encouraging the establishment of 
amnesty programs. The Air Force has Indi-
cated Its Intent to establish such a program 
In a letter to Chairman Hughes. However. 
the Navy and the Marine Corps have not yet 
Implemented the DOD directive. 
The various amnesty programs all Include 
provisions which allow a drug user to make 
his use known to the chaplain, doctor, or his 
commander; a guarantee of no disciplinary 
action If the user Is not under Investigation 
and so long as he stays clean; and some treat-
ment for his drug use. The response to the 
program Is mixed. In Europe. only 140 users 
per month have responded since June, 1970. 
out of a total population or 185,000 Army 
troops of which at least 10 percent are said 
to be chronic users. 
The apparent reasons for the minimal re-
sponse In Europe are several: (1) !allure of 
unit commanders-many or whom were !11-
prepared In the first place-to convey the 
concept of amnesty to their troops, and 
thereby signal their support or It, (2) a 
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widely held !eel!ng among drug users. espe-
cially hashish smokers. that there Is no 
wrong-physical moral or otherwise-In such 
use and hence nothing to be rehab!l!tated 
from; (3) a view among the troops that there 
are no Inducements to join, no Incentives, 
and no rewards, coupled with t he fact that a 
commanding omcer has "open-ended options" 
to withdraw a man from the amnesty pro-
gram at any time for any reason; (4) pres-
sure, !nclud1ng threats or actual bodily harm. 
by "hard" drug users and pushers against 
those who may wish to seek help under the 
program; (5) a reluctance on the part of 
some commanders to devote the considerable 
amount or time required to provide the sol-
dier with the supportive help he needs; and 
(6) t he !act that many who do participate 
are subjected to harassment w!tWn their 
units upon their return and that some com-
manders and top NCO's seem disposed to per-
mit this activity. 
The response In Vietnam Is also l!m!ted. 
There, many of the medical personnel we 
contacted felt that the program was not be-
Ing received as well as It should be among 
the troops because or the lack of a true guar-
antee or amnesty. The troops real!ze that 
only the chaplain has a true confidential 
communication privilege. The troops know 
that the doctors are required to provide med-
Ical Information to command and therefore 
are reluctant to come forth and reveal their 
drug abuse. Another factor which may ac-
count for the apparent lack or effectiveness 
Is the unavallab!ltty of adequate treatment 
for users In the war zone. Our Impression Is 
that the amnesty program often operates 
this way in VIetnam. The heavy user comes 
to omc!al attention when he seeks medical 
help after an overdose or other condition re-
lated to his drug taking; he undergoes de-
toxification, and within a matter of days Is 
returned to his unit as fit for duty; he may 
or may not be offered follow-up psychiatric 
assistance; and no punishment occurs un-
less he Is later caught taking drugs. The ex-
tent or treatment which war zone doctors 
can realistically offer under t he current 
manpower situation Is detoxification. There 
Is an !nsumc!ent number of psychiatrists to 
treat the characterological disorders which 
may underly the drug abuse. Those doctors 
who might otherwise be available for such 
treatment are primarily engaged In activi-
ties related to Drug Suppression Teams and 
In providing psychiatric eva! uat!on of ac-
cused persons !or disciplinary action. 
In short, the staff feels that the amnesty 
program Is based upon a sound principle, In 
that It attempts to provide a system which 
will get drug users Into facilities for treat-
ment. Early evidence, however, Indicates 
that the program Is not motivating the target 
group to volunteer for treatment and that 
even If they did volunteer, the treatment 
available Is not adequate to solve the drug 
problems of most users. 
The medical treatment provided by the 
military must be viewed In light of the at-
titudes of the' services toward prov1d!ng this 
type of treatment. Brig. Gen. George J . 
Hayes. Principal Deputy In the omce of the 
Secretary of Defense (Health and Environ-
ment) told the Subcommittee that the gen-
eral guideline !or medical personnel Is to re-
tain In the military medical systems only 
those Individuals who could be expected to 
return to full m!l!tary duty within a rea-
sonable time. What this means depends upon 
the circumstances of each Individual case. 
The staff also heard many expressions or the 
positions that the military Is not a social wel-
fare agency, that the long-term treatment 
and rehabilitation of drug abusers Is In con-
filet with the basic military mission, and 
t hat such persons should be removed from 
the sphere of military !nfiuence. 
However. the mill tary. particularly the 
Army, appears to be experimenting and try-
Ing to find such cl!nlcal approaches as will 
be effeet!ve w!tWn the scope or the military 
missions. We saw examples or tli!s approach 
In Operation Awareness at F'Qrt Bl'Sgg, and 
group therapy sessions at other bases. Gen-
eral Hayes Indicated that as projects are de-
veloped and prove to have some emcacy. they 
w!ll be Implemented elsewhere. 
D. The administrative process 
Or particular Importance IS the way the 
problem or drug abuse and drug abusers Is 
being handled In the administrative sense. 
At the highest level-policy development In 
DOD-the major effort to date has been the 
Issuance of the DOD directive on amnesty 
programs. While thls effort Is much needed, 
the lag of three years from the time of the 
first command level amnesty program to the 
Issuance of the broad directive Is regrettable. 
Even that order Is not mandatory In that 
the Individual services are authorized. but 
not required, to Initiate these programs. In-
asmuch as the Marine Corps and the Navy 
have not Instituted an amnesty program. the 
young soldier and airman are given greater 
opportunities to overcome their drug prob-
lem than are the young sailor and marine. 
The DOD has also recently Initiated ac-
tion to get a broad understanding of the 
problem. 0! Importance here are the studies 
undertaken by the Mack Task Force and the 
team headed by Jerome Vacek. These stud-
Ies cover DOD drug abuse policy and pro-
grams. There does not exist any service-wide 
data on drug abuse at the present time, but 
It Is our understanding that such a survey 
Is under consideration. We noticed the lack 
of hard data at all levels of command. No 
hard statistics as to the extent of use or the 
profile or typical users or the reasons !or 
use are available on a broad scale. 
At the command level, there seems to be a 
growing trend toward the use of nonjudi-
cial punishment under article 15 of the Uni-
form Code of M!l!tary Justice and other ad-
ministrative processes, rather than courts 
martial, In the handling of all but the most 
serious drug cases. A general court martial 
for a drug case Is almost unheard or. and 
Spee!al Courts Martial and Summary Courts 
are used Infrequently. A typical Illustration 
Is provided by the experience In the First Air 
Cavalry Division In Vietnam. In the disposi-
tion or marihuana cases. During 1969, there 
were no general courts martial, only 11 sum-
mary courts martial and 43 special courts 
martial. while there were 131 Article 15 cases 
Involving marihuana. Nor were there any 
narcotics con v!ct!ons In general courts mar-
tial In that division In either 1969 or 1970. 
There seem to be several reasons for this 
trend: (1) the considerable Investigation 
and paperwork required to prepare for a gen-
eral court martial; (2) overcrowding at the 
Long B!nh jail; (3) the requirement that a 
man punitively discharged be escorted back 
to the United States; (4) a feeling among 
Staff Judge Advocates that young omcers 
sitting on administrative boards are reluc-
tant to approve an undesirable discharge for 
a drug offender; (5) a further feeling among 
Staff Judge Advocat es that an Individual 
must be apprehended actually In possession 
In order to sustain a guilty verdict In a court 
martial ; (6) Improper search and seizure 
procedures and failure to maintain a proper 
chain of custody by unit commanders. 
Drug users with seeur!ty clearances also 
present a problem. We were told that It Is 
automatic to withhold security clearances 
from known drug users. even those given am-
nesty. We are aware of no complaints with 
this procedure. However. there seems to be 
no effective policy concerning t he restora-
tion of a seeur!ty clearancP. to a drug user 
once he has been rehab!l!tated. When a secu-
rity clearance Is withdrawn from a drug 
user, It may be restored after rehabilitation, 
but as one w!tnees testified, "Outliving a 
reputation and proving oneself as trust-
worthy may be d!!ficult Indeed." 
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A specla.l problem bas a.rtsen ln those over-
seas a.rea.s where there a.re heavy concen-
tra.tlons or mllltary dependents, pa.rtlcula.rly 
In Germany. The dependents a.re exposed to 
many of the same environmental pressures 
that the young mlllta.ry man. must !a.ce. The 
a.va.llablllty of drugs, the confilct with the 
loca.l culture, a.nd the a.bsence of alternAtive 
a.ctlvltles a.re some factors cited by mlllta.ry 
psychla.trlsts In Germa.ny as to why de-
pendents might use drugs. The psychiatrists 
Informed us that their effort.s a.t oomba.tlng 
the problem were prlma.rlly In the educa-
tional a.rea.. They were trying to develop 
curricula. !or the dependent's schools which 
would provide students with the ln!orma.tlon 
necessa.ry to rn&ke ma.ture decisions on drug 
use. They a.lso were attempting programs of 
ea.rly ldentlfica.tlon of peroona.llty problems 
so tha.t they could get emotional support to 
youngsters before they became victims of 
drug a.buse. 
The military bas a.ppa.rently resorted to 
another approach In deallng with drug a.buse 
among dependents. Inforrn&tlon received by 
the Subcommlttee sta.tr, prlnclpa.lly letters 
!rom servicemen, lndlca.tes tha.t tra.ns!er Is 
a. commonly used device to remove unl-
!crmed fathers whose teen-a.ged dependents 
have become Involved with drugs. Report.s 
have been received or threa.ts to a. father's 
career as being used to remove !amilles with 
teena.ged users !rom an overseas post. A 
clvlllan coWlSelor for the Army said he had 
dealt with eleven cases since' the swnmer of 
1970 by use of forced retirement and re-
enlistment (so that return to the United 
Sta.tes Is lmmedla.te). He reported that the 
tactic wa.s successful since he ha.d had no 
drug problems a.mong dependent children 
since September. He did acknowledge, how-
ever, tha.t ln n one of the cases was the next 
duty station given full pa.rtlcula.rs a.bout the 
real rea.son !or reassignment, nor was help 
requested tor the !a.mlly. 
V. DISCUSSION 
In thls section. we shall discuss certa.ln 
Issues, questions, and problem areas which 
we !eel are suggested by our findings, con-
clusions and Impressions set out In the sec-
tions above. Whlle we recognize that the 
scope of our Investigation was llmlted and 
tha.t we do not ha.ve expert knowledge of 
sta.tutes, policies, a.nd regula.tlons rela.tlng to 
the Armed Services and the Veterans Ad-
mlnlstra.tlon, we believe tha.t the following 
discussion wlll be useful ln forming the fur-
ther consldera.tlon of these problems by the 
Subcommittee, the Armed Services Commit-
tee, or the various mllltary branches. 
A. Lack of hard data relating to the extent 
an.d nature of drug abuse 
It Is our conclusion that there ls a definite 
lack of hard, scientific data which shows the 
nature a.nd extent of drug abuse ln the mili-
tary. This lack has been recognized by the 
DOD. It has Indicated to the Subcommittee 
that a.n epidemiological study of broad scope. 
wlll be underta.ken ln the nea.r future. We 
believe that such a study would be helpful 
!or several reasons: 
1. It would show the extent and nature of 
drug abuse activities of young men entering 
the military service. 
2. It would show the nature and extent of 
drug a.buse act! vltles engaged ln by service-
men while members of the Armed Forc64-
3 . It would lndlca.te the personal character-
Istics and the external circumstances common 
to Individuals who abuse drugs. 
4. It would Indicate those personal char-
acteristics and external circumstances which 
are common to Individuals who retrain from 
c r cease using drugs. 
This Information would be extremely valu-
a.ble In determining the more precise alloca.-
tlon of resources and the design of programs 
to meet specific needs a.s revea.led In the study. 
We urge tha.t this study be begun as soon as 
possible and on a.s broad a basts as possible. 
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B . Issues relating to the prevention. of drug 
abuse 
The discussion of the factors rela.tlng to 
the causes of drug abuse suggested two ap-
proaches to the programs designed to prevent 
drug abuse In the military: one Is rela.ted to 
oha.racterlstlcs d! Individual drug users and 
the other concerns the clrcurnsta.nces which 
a.re present ln the user's environment. 
1. Prevention-Individual Factors 
In the sections concerning the character-
Istics of the typical user and the reasons why 
young soldiers engage In drug al>use, some 
common personal factors seemed to be pres-
ent. There were a.lso Indications of attributes 
common to the hea.vy or chronic user who 
was most llk.ely to come to the attention or 
comma.nd either medically or legally. These 
common attributes Included: age 19- 22, ra.nk 
E-4 or below, unmarried, low educa.tlon, 
draftee or non-career oriented enlistee, !rom 
a. broken home, and personality or character-
ological disorders. The most recent studies 
which have been done to date Indicate that 
a significant proportion of the drug abusers 
being Identified In the Army ha.d engaged In 
drug abuse before entering the military, In-
cluding some Individuals who ha.d used 
heroin. For example, the survey among 82nd 
Airborne Division troops showed: " Approxi-
mately one ha.l! of the marijuana users (who 
represented 64 percent of the total sample) 
began use prior to coming Into the Army 
whUe approximately 4 out of 10 of the opiate 
users (who represented 17 per cent d! the 
total sample) first used opiates prior to en-
tering the Army. Further, there ls evidence 
that a majority of those In the sample that 
are heavy drug users began their drug ha.'blt 
In civilian life." 
This suggests that the Incidence and Im-
pact of drug abuse In the mllltary could pos-
sibly be reduced slgnlfica.ntly by eliminating, 
In the Induction process, those lndlvduals 
whose personal characterstlcs Indicate that 
they are "drug-prone" or who are most at 
rlsk when exposed to drugs. Obviously, this 
approach Is not without dltllculty. Some can-
didates !or lnduclilon may attempt to use 
alleged drug abuse to escape their obllga.tlon. 
Others may attempt to conceal their habits 
so that they may Join hoping to be cured. A 
specla.l problem Is prooented by the drug 
a.buser In civilian life who enlists In the 
Army when given the choice of mllltary serv-
Ice or jail by hls loco.! Judge. 
In addition, there are few, I! any, reliable 
tests to determine actual drug use or those 
most likely to become drug a.bllS(>rs. The 
medical officers at Induction stations now 
consider Individuals under the ''whole man" 
concept and try to weigh all relevant !actors 
In each case to determine an Individual's 
potentia.! as a military man. This Is clearly a 
difficult task. 
An additional problem arises In deter-
mining what should be done with an Indi-
vidual If he Is rejected at the Induction 
level as a known drug user or as likely to 
become one. This Individual, whlle not a 
rt.sk to the mlllta.ry community, rn&y present 
difficulties for the civilian community. So far 
as the Subcommittee staff could determine 
there Is no forma.! mecha.nl&m !or referring 
to ctvlllan trea.tment a.gencles those rejected 
a.t the Induction station who rn&y doo.lre 
trea.tment. In contrast, however, under 
regulations governing the operation of these 
stations, a candidate !or Induction who Is 
Infected with venereal disease Is required to 
obta.ln treatment at a U.S. Health Service 
HospltaJ. before reporting back to the station 
for further exarnlna tlon. 
In view of the foregoing, we recommend 
that the Alcoholism a.nd Narcotics Subcom-
mittee or the Anned Services Committee lm-
medla.tely undertake discussions with the 
rntllta.ry to determine the feasibility of 
taking appropriate action based on the 
following questions: 
a.. Whether the Armed Forces should give 
special priority to developing reliable 
methods of Identifying drug abusers and 
potentia.! drug abusers a.t the Alrmed Forces 
Examining and Entrance Stations and else-
where In the military system. 
b . Whether a study should be undertaken 
to determine lf eilltrance exa.mlnatlons can 
and should be made more effective ln screen-
Ing out drug abusers and those who a.re prone 
to drug abuse. Such a study might Include 
an a.n.a.lysls of the techniques which can be 
used to screen such lndlvldua.ls, a. cost-bene-
fit a.na.lysls of such techniques, and rocom-
mendatlons of those techniques which might 
be successfully used by the Armed Forces. 
c. Whether Individuals who are rejected 
!or service In the Armed Forces because 
ot drug 1\buse or drug dependence should, 
wlth thet'r consent, be referred to appro-
priate civilian prevention and trea.tment fa-
cilities. Such a determination should Include 
e. consideration of the resources available In 
the clvllla.n community at large. 
d. Whether the Armed Forces should es-
tablish a system !or evalua.tlng the per-
formance of each AFEES station In screen-
Ing out drug abusers. Such a. system might 
seek to Identify those AFEES stations where 
significant numbers of Individuals have been 
admitted to service with undetected drug 
a.buse and drug dependence problems which 
subsequently Interfere with their military 
performance. 
2. Preven.tion.-En.viron.men.talfactors 
In earlier sections, there was considerable 
d iscussion of environmental factors which 
might lead to or foster drug abuse among 
military personnel. These Included: lack of 
satisfying work; boredom; stress !rom com-
bat; peer group pressure; development of a 
sub-culture organized around values anti-
thetical to the mllltary; a dlvlslon between 
young enlisted men and "lifer" NCO's and 
officers; and the lack or acceptable social and 
recreational alternatives. 
In addition, a number of !actors were cited 
by the Air Force, particularly ln Thailand, 
as contributed to a low drug abuse rate. 
These Included better ca.llber of personnel 
(higher education, better motivation); hlgh 
sense of job satisfaction; high ratio of of-
ficers and non-commissioned officers to en-
listed personnel; no draftees; selectivity In 
recruiting; and acceptable recreational alter-
natives. Another !actor which was suggested 
as tending to prevent or reduce the desire 
to participate In drug abuse wa.s the "buddy 
system." 
While these we~e presented to the staff as 
possible !actors affecting the rate of drug 
abuse, we do not feel that we have sufficient 
Information concerning these assertions to 
make any firm recommendation as to their 
validity. However, they do point the way to 
possible approaches which would reduce the 
motivation to take drugs and thereby re-
duce the demand !or Illegal drugs. 
Therefore, we recommend further study 
of these !actors, both positive and negative, 
to evaluate the Impact they h ave upon drug 
abusers and whether positive alternatives 
can be developed to reduce the Impact or 
negative elements. 
C. PREVENTION-EDUCATION 
The education activities which the various 
military branches have been presenting fall 
Into two ca.tegorles, command training and 
troop education. As noted above, primary 
emphasis Is being placed upon command 
training, the purpose of which Is to enable 
the command cadre to carry out legal and 
dlsclpllna.ry functions. Education which 
would enable command personnel to under-
stand the causes of drug abuse and to deal 
with troops before they begin drug a.buse Is, 
In the opinion of sta.ff, generally lacking and 
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should be strengthened. In addition, It Is our 
Impression that present educational activi-
ties directed toward the troops themselves 
are not effective In preventing the desire to 
use drugs and should be evaluated. 
In view of the foregoing, we believe that 
the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Nar-
cotics or the Armed Services Committee Im-
mediately undertake discussions with the 
military to determine the feasibility of taking 
appropriate action based on the following 
questions: 
I. Whether to shift the priority of dru8 
abuse education from command training to 
troop education. 
2. Whether a more Intensive troop educa-
tion program and permitting Individual par-
ticipation, would be effective In reducing 
drug abuse In the mllltary. 
3. Whether "Drug Abuse Suppression 
Teams" with expertise In effective educational 
techniques and a knowledge of legal, medi-
cal, and social ramifications of drug abuse, 
are a useful tool In meeting the drug chal-
lenge. 
D. PREV'ENTION-LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The primary question In the law enforce-
ment field relates to the relative priority of 
law enforcement activities as compared to 
prevention programs aimed at reducing the 
motivation to use drugs. As noted above, the 
current laws relating to the use or drugs 
(particularly marijuana} and their enforce-
ment do not seem to be providing any sig-
nificant deterrent effect. Other factors favor 
a shift away from a basically law enforcement 
approach, particularly In Southeast Asia. 
The control of the supply and distribution 
of drugs under the ecological, economic, and 
political conditions In those countries Is 
difficult. Director Ingersoll testUied that he 
thought American troops would be gone from 
Southeast Asia before sny significant changes 
were made there. The total amount or drug 
supplies which can be stopped seems to be 
limited, regardless of manpower limitations. 
This was recognized by the CID of the 4th 
Infl,'ntry Division when It provided the main 
Impetus In establishing Its amnesty program 
In early 1968. 
Specific problems affecting the legal and 
law enforcement process of the . military In 
dealing with drug abuse Include: Improper 
search and seizures by unit command per-
sonnel; !allure to maintain proper chains of 
custody In preserving evidence; and delays In 
getting laboratory a.na.lysls of suspected 
drugs. We suggest that further emphasis be 
placed upon developing procedures and trl'ln-
lng programs which would eliminate these 
problems. 
E. PROCESSING OF DRUG ABUSERS--TREATMENT 
ANO REHABU..ITATION 
The Issue of treatment and rehabilitation 
of drug abusers Is the most complex and dif-
ficult of all those dealt with In ' our Investi-
gation. There can be little doubt that drug 
abusers, especially those who are addicted or 
dependent on drugs, should receive medical 
trea.tmen t whether they are In the clvlllan or 
the mllltary community. 
However, the questions as to how that 
treatment Is to be delivered to the abuser, 
by whom It Is to be delivered, the nature of 
the treatment necessary, and under what cir-
cumstances It should be delivered have not 
been definitively answered whether In the 
context of the military or civilian communi-
ties. As regards the drug abuser In the mUI-
ta.ry, the most difficult question Is to what 
extent, I! any, should the military treat a. 
drug abuser found In Its ranks. As previously 
noted, the Armed Forces have taken the 
position that they should undertake treat-
ment of a. drug user In the military only I! 
he can be restored to duty within a. "reason-
able" time. The general position of medical 
practitioners and command personnel In the 
military Is that It Is not consistent with the 
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mission or the military to undertake long-
term treatment and rehabllltatlon. 
The trestment which Is now provided In 
the military services seems to be limited In 
scope and duration. The closest approach to 
long te\-m rehabilitation In the military Is 
"Operation Awareness" at Fort Bragg where 
the program Is 12 weekS long. This experi-
mental program Is attempting to deal with 
hard narcotic addicts as well as those de-
pendent on soft drugs. 
Under the amnesty program, the treat-
ment provided Is mln.lma.l. It does not a.p-
pea.r to ~ro beyond detoxlflca.ttan, 1! neces-
saa:Y, and short -<term psyc!wthera.py or group 
th.erapy. This Is particularly true for cases 
a.rl.slng under the program ln the Vletna.m 
War zone. There the oondlll!ons under whlch 
treatment Is given make It extremely difficult 
to deal with any thing other th.am the acute 
effeots of drug abuse. It would be nearly 
Impossible to provide trestment of under-
lying psychological disorders while m.alnta.ln-
lng an Individual In his unit under com.balt 
ormdl ttans. Anatther dlfficul ty with trea.t-
ment In the war zone Is that any kind or 
tre01tment which would remove a.n Individual 
from oomb&t oond1tl0Il6 would tempt ma.ny 
Individuals 100 take advan~e of the program 
solely for the purpose of avoiding combat. 
This would be pa.rtloula.rly tJrue l!, as some 
have proposed. a oentiral treatment fa.clllty 
were ·to be esta.bllshed there. some medical 
personnel have also pointed out that a. cen-
tralized !acUity Is not satisfactory from a 
therapy point of view In that It removes 
the pa.ttent !rom hls natura..! envlroounent 
a.nd Increases the difficulty of relntegra.tlng 
him Into e.ny k!lnd of mlllta.ry unit. 
Adding to the complexity or the trea.t-
ment pro•blem Is the Issue of whether or not 
there a.re adequate Tesouroes within th.e mili-
tary to provide treatment, even under the 
limited responslbllltles a.ssumed by the 
Armed Services toda.y. There a.re several rae-
tors which should be considered at this 
point : 
1. The true extent of the dl'ug abuse prob-
lem Is unknown. 
2. There Is a. current sh0Tta.lr8 of tradned 
medical and men ta.l hea.!Jth pensonnel. 
3. The rota.tlon of mlllta.ry ~nel usu· 
ally mlll•tateB a.g&lnst the OveT!&p or key 
people and the retention of personnel 1n a 
single pOS!ltlon long e.ru>ugh to !ully develop 
any treatment progTa.m. 
As to the sho.nta.ge o! tra.lned me<J;tcaJ and 
menta.! health pe<!Wnnel, the ste.ff was told 
thlllt In September, 1970, there were only 13 
Army psychlartml.sts 1n Vietnam, a.nd only 
one Army Md one Air Faroe psych.la.tr.tst In 
Thailand. In Eu~ope we were told thlllt the 
ATmy has more psych1ata'lsts thflln In Vlet-
nam, on the ground that there Is a grea.ter 
spread of lnd.lvtdual Installations In Europe. 
The present normal tour of duty for phy-
stclans and psychiatrists In the Army Is 
three years a.t one duty sta.tlon except In 
Vietnam where It ls one yea~r. We were told, 
however, tha.t DOD was oontempla.tlng rec-
ommending a flre-yea.r normal tow- or <!lheee 
personnel. 
Another Issue relating to treatment and re-
ha.bllltatlon Is whether confldentla.llty of 
communications should be preserved In all 
tre'atment and reha.blllta.tlon rela.tlonshlps 
Involving the drug user who elects to seek 
asslsta.nce under a.n amnesty program. 
The Depa.rtment or Defense did not ad-
dress this Issue In Its Directive 1300.12. Nor 
did the Army In AR 600- 32. However, the 
Alr Force, ln Its amnesty progra.m, will grant 
"certain limited privileged communication 
rights." 
Under current military practice, there Is 
generally no gua.rantee of prlvlleged com-
munt.;a.ttons between doctor and patient. This 
Is based upon the Department or De!ense 
position that "a mlllta.ry service must have , 
or be able to obtain, full l&nd complete In-
formation at a.ny time a.s to the physical or 
mental capacity of Its members. A rule pro-
viding otherwise would place the military 
In the untenable position of ha.vlng little 
cr no ldea as to the physical or mental con-
ditions of the members of the service." 
Obviously, this rule gives rise to conflict 
when the rubject matter or the prtvlle!red 
communication Is also lllega.J. It becomes par-
ticularly a.cute In the context of the amnesty 
progra.m pollcy of encouraging drug users to 
seek treatment. This confltct wa.s repeatedly 
cl ted a.s discouraging drug users from seeking 
help even though they were otherwise moti-
vated to seek lt. The fear o( prosecution on 
the basis of Information divulged In the 
course of treatment has apparently not been 
overcome by the guYantee of amnesty esta.b-
llshed In the progra.m. 
Medical personnel did point out, however, 
that "often In treatment and reha.bllltatlon It 
Is very lmpOTtant that ceTtaln people who 
are In Important social positions be notlfled 
hl order to enlist a.sslsta.nce In helping some-
one. So In tha.t sense strict confldentlallty 
may not be something you wa.nt to ma.ln-
ta.ln, but It Is the lllegallty which poses a 
major problem." 
AI though the a.mnesty policy does pre-
clude prosecution upon the basis of Informa-
tion divulged by an Individual when seeking 
medical a.sslstance under the program, It Is 
clear that It Is not Intended to prohibit the 
use or such lnforma.tlon for such a.drnlnls-
tratl ve action as removal !rom ftytng sta.tus 
or the revocation or a security clearance. The 
Air Force a.lso Indicates tha.t such ln!oTmB.-
tlon could be used under Its a.mnesty pro-
gra.m to admlnlstra.tlvely discharge a drug 
user under honorable oondl tlons. It also has 
lnd,.lcated that In the case of a. temporary 
suspension OT dlsqua.llflca.tlon from flying 
status, a. one year period o! abstinence would 
be the minimum time before restora.tlion of 
such status. 
In the Army the security clearance or a 
drug a.buser Is withheld automatically upon 
dlsclos:.~re. While this withdrawal Is charac-
terized as temporary, no specific guidelines 
have been established to permit relnstltutlon 
of the clearance. 
It should be noted that If the drug abuser 
does not voluntarily seek help under an am-
nesty program there might be no knowledge 
of the drug abuse and therefore the Individ-
ual would retain flying status, security, 
clearance, etc. 
The admlnlstra t1 ve processing or known 
drug abusers whether those participating In 
amnesty programs or those a.pprehended for 
drug abuse violations presents several other 
Issues. 
A major question raised by the administra-
tive processing of drug abuse offenders, 
whether by Article 15 action, administrative 
action, or through judicial action, Is the re-
lationship between the administrative action 
and treatment and rehabllltatlon. Rega.rdless 
or whether punishment or separation of a 
drug abuse offen<.ler Is administered, the of-
fender In ma.ny situations has physical or 
mental health problems related to his use 
of drugs. Therefore consideration must be 
given to providing treatment or reha.blllta-
tlon to the offender as well as to the Individ-
ual who volu'ltarllv seeks asslsta.nce under 
the amnesty program or otherwise. Factors 
which should be given consideration In de-
termining the proper disposition or an or-
fender lncl11de: 
I. Whether It Is a first offense. 
2. The se\'erlty o! the offense (pushing 
vs. use}. 
3. The wllllngness or the offender to ac-
cept treatment. 
4. The degree of physical addiction or psy-
chological dependents upon the drug. 
5. The evaluation or the severity o! any 
underlying psychological problems. 
6. The length or service or the offender and 
the length o! time left In his current obllga-
tlon. 
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Another problem arises In the carses or 
those who have actually been separated !rom 
the military !or drug offenses. We were pre-
sented With some evidence that those who 
are separated with n.nyth1ng less than an 
honorable discharge are subjected to disCrim-
Ination when re-entering clv111an l!fe. This 
can be particularly dlmcult !or the drug or-
fender as he has characterological problems 
which make him 11. marginal Individual Ln so-
ciety anyway. A discharge other than honor-
able pl.u:es one more barrier In his way. How-
ever, It was the position o! some rnllltary 
personnel that the discharge Is an assessment 
ot the job performance o! the Individual In 
his military !unction and therefore no modi-
fication In pol!cy would be appropriate to 
alleviate the burden of the drug offender. 
Another ls1ue worthy of mention Is the 
mJl!tary dependent and drug abuse. The pri-
mary pl.u:e where we came Into contact With 
dependent use was In Germany. We heard 
reports or admJnistratlve a.ctlon (early re-
tirement, transfer, loss of quarters) being 
taken against a parent because o! his child's 
use of drugs. We learned ot drug education 
and prevention efforts beLng made by de-
pendent school<; and medical personnel. We 
would recommend, however, that the prob-
lem of drug use among dependents and pro-
grams designed to combat that problem be 
given further study and evaluation. 
Because o! the Interrelationship between 
treatment and rehabilitation, and admlnis-
tratl ve processing of drug abusers, we believe 
that the Subcommittee on Alcohol!sm a.nd 
Narcotics or the Armed Services Committee 
should lmmedlat~ly undertake d!sc!IBslons 
With the Inil!ta.ry to determine the feasibil-
Ity of taking appropriate action based upon 
the folloWing questions: 
1. Whether It Is feasible !or the Defense 
Department to establ!sh a comprehensive, In-
tegrated, and mandatory policy under which 
servicemen who are drug dependent or drug 
addicts are provided treatment and rehab111-
tatlon wl thln the military service. 
2. Whether It Is feasible for the Defense 
Department to er,tabl!sh a program whereby 
a drug offender who desires medical treat-
ment ca.n receive It Within the military. 
3. Whether a program can be developed 
whereby servicemen Identified ~ drug de-
pendent persons or drug addicts can be sepa-
rated trom the military and provided With 
treatment, tr necessary, In the clvll1an com-
munity. 
4. Whether It Is feasible to consider such 
.u:tlons as postponement o! trial or d!sclpl!-
na.ry proceedlngT3, suspension of sentence, or 
other devices commonly used In clv!Jia.n 
courts, a.s alternatives or In l!eu of prooecu-
tlon o! drug dependent persons or drug ad-
dicts. 
5. Whether absolute confidentlal!ty In 
privileged· communications Is necessary or 
feasible within the meaning of amnesty pro-
grams. 
6. Whether guldel!nes can be developed to 
permit the restoration o! flying status, secu-
rity clearance or other prlv1leged status, 
Within a reasonable time after rehab111tatlon. 
7. Whether treatment and rehab111tatlon 
efforts should be carried out In central treat-
ment f.u:ll!tles, Within the context of a local 
unit or both. 
8. Whether drug dependent persons or 
drug addicts should be granted non-puni-
tive discharges and be el!glble !or all or some 
veterans benefits. 
9. Whether the Veterans AdmJnlstratlon 
should give priority to Increasing Its capa-
bll!ty to care !or drug dependent persons or 
drug addicts. 
10. Whether mJlltary medical manpower 
can be allocated so that continuity Is pre-
served In treatment and prevention pro-
grams. 
11. Whether It Is feasible to allocate greater 
manpower and monetary resources to all ele-
-12-
ments of the millta.l}' which deal With drug 
abuse. 
12. Whether It Is feasible to gl ve priority to 
peer group participation and the use of ex-
addicts In prevention, treatment and rehabil-
Itation programs. 
Mr. MANSFIEI.J). Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. HUGHES. I yield. 
Mr. MANSFIEI.J). Mr. President, I 
commend the distinguished Senator from 
Iowa for once again taking the initiative 
in a field which is of transcendent im-
portance. 
We have been hearing a great deal 
from congressional sources about the rise 
in the drug problem in Indochina, and 
perhaps in Southeast Asia as a whole, 
and we~ becoming aware of what this 
means to us in more ways than one. 
I recall the interest of the dis tin-
gUished Senator from Iowa in going down 
to Fort Bragg some monthS ago to look 
into the drug treatment program as it 
affected, I believe, members of the air-
bome·troops at that base. If I recall cor-
rectly, the Senator was very pleased with 
the attitude of the commanding officer 
there, and the attempts which he was 
making to try to bring about rehabilita-
tion of those who had become addicted 
to drugs-many of them to the hard-type 
heroin and the like. 
The Senator bas now become the chair-
man of a committee which will be able 
to look into this matter more thoroughly. 
I anticipate that the kind of job which 
the distinguished Senator from Iowa will 
do will be one which is long overdue, 
which will be welcomed by the Senate 
and the country as a whole, and which 
will help to point a way toward a solu-
tion of this problem, which is growing 
not better but worse with the passage of 
time, and which will affect not only the 
military, as it does at the moment, but in 
time will affect the population as a whole. 
Again I commend the distinguished 
Senator for his initiative in this most im-
portant and delicate field . 
Mr. HUGHES. I thank the Senator 
from Montana . 
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I wish to join with the distinguished 
majority leader in commending the 
thoughtful and able Senator from Iowa 
for his work in regard to the drug prob-
lem in our Armed Forces, I do not know 
of any subject more important for con-
gressional consideration than the ac-
celerated use of drugs in the Armed 
Forces. It presents a grave danger to our 
Armed Forces. As a Senator and as a citi-
zen, I am very glad that the conscien-
tious, dedicated, and able Senator from 
Iowa is cba.i.ring a committee to delve 
deeply into this problem. 
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